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Abstract
This study examines the role of contracting in reducing transaction costs in smalI-
scale mussel farming in Saldanha Bay. Masiza Mussel Growers (Masiza), an initiative
by the public and private sector to address the imbalances of the past through
entrepreneurial development, are used as a case study hence a case study approach is
followed. Two transactions were considered, one between Masiza and Blue Bay Aqua
Farm (Blue Bay) and another between La Vie Sea Food Products (La Vie) and
Masiza. These transactions form the basis for analysis.
Market risks, uncertainties, environmental risks, information incompleteness,
illiteracy, limited technical knowledge of farming, lack of appropriate infrastructure
and lack of transport facilities are identified and examined as possible sources of
transaction costs that constrain the existing supply chain relationship. The study
shows that asset specificity, time specificity, and site specificity playa positive role in
the supply chain as they result in relative dependency amongst parties. Opportunistic
behavior within the existing supply chain is neutral, but appears to be relatively high
on the spot or fresh live market. Characteristics of market transactions for mussels and
associated transaction costs suggest that fresh-live spot market trading for Masiza is
difficult to attain. This therefore motivates parties (Masiza) to contract or vertically
integrate, as it is costly and risky to rely on spot live markets. Interviewees (Masiza)
pointed out that the benefits associated with contract farming outweigh the transaction
costs associated with this governance structure. Hence a market specification contract
with the La Vie (a processing company), and a production management and resource
provision contract with Blue Bay (a larger producer) were designed. They reduce
transaction costs associated with fresh-live markets and ensure a more stable and
reliable market for growers.
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Uittreksel
Die studie ondersoek die rol van kontraktering in die vermindering van transaksie
koste vir klein skaal mossel produsente in Saldanha baai. Die Masiza Mussel Growers
(Masiza) word as gevallestudie gebruik. Twee transaksies met o.a. Blue bay Aqua
Farm (Blue Bay) en La Vie Sea Food Products (La Vie) was ter sprake en
laasgenoemde het as basis vir die analise gedien.
Mark risiko, onsekerheid, omgewings risiko, gebrekkige informasie, ongeletterdheid,
beperkte tegniese kennis, beperkte infrastruktuur en beperkte verroer fasiliteite is
geidentifiseer en ondersoek as moontlike oorsake van hoë transaksie koste wat die
huidige aanbod ketting strem. Die studie toon aan dat interafhanklikheid tussen die
betrokke partye deur bate, tyd en area spesifisiteite bevorder word en dus 'n positiewe
rol in die aanbod ketting speel. Opportunistiese gedrag binne die bestaande aanbod
ketting is neutraal, maar blyk hoog te wees in die vars mark. Transaksie kostes en
eienskappe blyk beduidende beperkinge te wees vir kleinskaal mossel produsente om
aktief deel te neem in die mark. Die opstel van kontrakte (of vertikale integrasie) blyk
dus 'n uitkoms te wees. Respondente het aangetoon dat kontrak boerdery voordelig
blyk te wees. Laasgoemde het tot die ontwikkeling van mark kontrakte met die La
Vie ('n verwerkings maatskappy) asook produksie bestuur en hulpbron voorsiennings
kontrakte met Blue Bay ('n groot kommersiële produsent) gelei. Die kontrakte beperk
transaksie koste vir die vars mark en verseker 'n stabiele en betroubare mark vir
produsente. 'n Transaksie koste analiese word gebruik om transaksie kostes te
ondersoek en te verifieer binne die industrie.
v
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1 Introduction
In the agricultural sector contract farming is an option worth exploring due to the
increased reliance on supply chains. By affiliating small-scale producers, who do not
have the capacity in terms of volume or know-how, with larger producers or
commercial enterprises under some form of contractual or co-production
arrangements, new export capacities and greater competitiveness can be achieved
(International Trade Forum, 2002).
According to Makhura (2001), this affiliation of small producers can be achieved by
commercialising subsistence agriculture. As in other areas of the world, particularly in
developing countries, small producers face barriers to accessing markets due to a
number of constraints that reduce incentives for participation.
When affiliating these small producers to the mainstream, their capacity to produce
competitively must be taken into consideration (Ngqangweni et al., 1999). From an
economic point of view it can be argued that these farmers have the potential to
survive, if a set of opportunities is provided (Makhura, 2001). The challenge is then to
provide opportunities to smallholder agriculture to show that there are agricultural
activities that small farmers can undertake both profitably and efficiently in the
current South Africa (Ngqangweni et al., 1999).
When improving participation of these farmers in the mainstream, particularly within
mariculture industries, policies governing this sector cannot be ignored. Until recently
no formal government policy was available for fisheries, including for mariculture, in
South Africa. In 1997 a White Paper on Marine Fisheries Policy for South Africa wás
produced, in which mariculture is clearly identified as a sector requiring special
attention, particularly with regard to promoting expansion and diversification of
activities. The principles on which the policy rests address issues such as fair and
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equitable access, transparency and accountability, and the Reconstruction and
Development Programme (Brink, 2001).
Most importantly, the fisheries policy is founded on the belief that all natural marine
living resources in South Africa, as well as the environment in which they exist and in
which mariculture activities occur, are national assets and the heritage of its entire
people. Hence they should be managed and developed for the benefit of present and
future generations. Being the lead agency for mariculture in South Africa, Marine and
Coastal Management (MCM) will need to play a major role in achieving these
objectives.
The recent restructuring of MCM is seen as the creation of a committed mariculture
section that is tasked with co-ordinating the development process in mariculture.
Mariculture in South Africa is therefore poised to become a bigger role player in the
field of marine resources, as existing operators approach production targets, new
entrants become established, and the technology for exploiting new species is
developed.
1.1 Background of the project
The Masiza Mussel Growers (Masiza), an initiative by the public and private sector to
address the imbalances of the past through entrepreneurial development, was
established. Masiza (Pty Ltd) was put under the custodianship of the Centre for
Integrated Rural Development (CIRD), which is a non-governmental organisation
focusing on enterprise development in disadvantaged communities (Karaan, 1999).
The Community Public Private Partnership (CPPP) has facilitated the new Masiza,
with a large mussel growing enterprise (Blue Bay Aqua Farm) as the technical partner
of this venture. The purpose of this initiative is to revitalise dormant rural economies
through the linking of resource-rich rural communities with private sector investors
interested in the sustainable utilisation of those natural resources.
2
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Blue Bay Aqua Farm (Blue Bay) sold six of its mussel rafts to its ex-employees
(Masiza). Masiza members know the business of mussel mariculture, because they
were trained as employees of Blue Bay, where they were employed for 2 years before
the project began. In addition they also worked for another mussel producer before
joining Blue Bay. This shows that these individuals have considerable experience
regarding mussel production.
Despite this considerable experience, low levels of literacy (which ranges between
grade 0-4) inhibit them from acquiring relevant managerial, marketing, networking
and other business skills. These growers are all Xhosa speaking originally from
Transkei and none of them speak nor understand English/Afrikaans, which are the
most important languages in doing business. The project has been in operation since
June 2002.
1.2 Research questions
The following questions serve as guidelines to the study. This section begins with the
central question and two sub-questions:
What are the necessary elements of a viable contract that ensure resource
provision, production management activities and market specification at lower
transaction costs for Masiza? Following this question are two sub-questions which
serve to further simplify the central question.
• What are the transaction cost factors facing Masiza that impede them from
participating within the industry?
• What is the nature of the relationship that is necessary to improve co-ordination
and to enhance contractual arrangements between Masiza and the processor that
addresses opportunism, information incompleteness, uncertainty and contract
incompleteness?
1.3 Problem Statement
Since 1994 several processes have been put in place in South Africa to reverse
discriminatory legislation and to improve participation, while at the same time
3
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important initiatives have been implemented to deregulate and liberalise the
agricultural sector. The rapid process of deregulation and liberalisation in the past
decade has exposed the limited capacity of many farmers to adjust to market changes
(National Department of Agriculture, 2001).
The existing market provides tough competition for small growers. The new market
system has made it hard for small growers to participate in mainstream agriculture. It
is difficult to access markets due to several market requirements, lack of bargaining
power and sophisticated consumer demands. It becomes difficult for small growers to
convince consumers to choose or buy their products rather than those of commercial
producers, due to the lack of resources and the required technology to compete.
The result therefore is that most of the produce is consumed by their families or sold
at very low prices to avoid waste. As Makhura (2001) indicated, most small farmers
will take any price offered by buyers as long as there is a chance to trade. As shown
by Karaan (1999 and 2002), small mussel growers in particular are faced with these
problems which are associated with high transaction costs in the industry.
Masiza faces costs of accessing markets, environmental risks such as red tide disease,
and rapid deterioration in water quality which affect product quality, market risks
which are exacerbated by perishability of mussels, lack of transport and
telecommunication facilities, lack of market information, managerial skills, illiteracy
and other infrastructure, inability to access production credit etc. Masiza faces
transport problems such as getting to the rafts (production units), delivery and
collection of products and seeds. As stated by Makhura (2001), the presence of these
costs impedes the participation of small farmers in the mainstream agriculture.
4
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These transaction costs prevail in different phases of the industry and are
characterised as pre-production! transaction costs, production' transaction costs, and
processing and rnarketing ' transaction costs.
Due to the above-mentioned constraints Masiza find it difficult to operate
independently without support from a large grower and a processor. In this instance a
partnership between Masiza, a processor (La Vie Sea Food Products) and a large
commercial producer (Blue Bay) is worth exploring. This partnership will enable
Masiza to penetrate the market and actively participate in the mainstream agriculture
through the help of Blue Bay and La Vie Sea Food Products (La Vie).
This collaboration can afford Masiza the opportunity to grow quality mussels under
the supervision and support of the Blue Bay. In addition, production equipment and
production management services can be rendered to Masiza. Training and mentoring
programmes for capacity building can also be made accessible through this
collaboration. Therefore working with Blue Bay will eliminate most of these
constraints and minimise production, environmental and market risks.
In order to ensure that these market risks and uncertainties associated with markets
are minimised, a partnership between Masiza and La Vie is explored. This will ensure
Masizas access to a guaranteed market and a constant flow of income and therefore
increase their opportunities to obtain production credit from other financial
institutions.
1.4 Hypothesis
This study follows the hypothesis that contractual arrangements will reduce
transaction costs and improve the participation of Masiza in commercial markets. This
study assumes that when transaction costs are low, co-ordination between Masiza,
I Karaan (2002) refers to this as the presence of asset specificity, information asymmetry, bureaucracy,
high investment requirements, and adverse selection.
2 According to Karaan (2002) this refers to the presence of factors such as diseconomies of scale,
moral hazard, hold-up problems and co-ordination with the processor regarding perishability of the
product, etc .
. These refer to the prisoner's dilemma, information asymmetry, economies of scale in marketing, etc.
5
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Blue Bay and La Vie will improve and more participation from all parties will take
place. Therefore the underlying assumption of the study is that the transaction costs
could be improved by a contract that will regulate trade relationships between Masiza,
Blue Bay, and La Vie. This assumption emanates from Williamson's argument that
institutions should be designed in order to minimise transaction costs. Therefore a
contract is designed both as an incentive and adaptation tool to minimise transaction
costs for Masiza.
1.5 Objective of the study
The main aim of the study is to design a viable contract that ensures resource
provision, production management activities and market specifications that reduce
transaction costs for Masiza. Such a contract will establish relevant relations between
Masiza, Blue Bay and La Vie. The contract should cover resource provision,
production management activities and market specification aspects.
When designing this contract, transaction cost factors facing Masiza, Blue Bay and La
Vie are identified and used as guidelines and determinants for an appropriate contract
for these parties. According to Warning et al (2002) and Eggerston (1999) the whole
concept of contracting relies on the level and nature of transaction costs, as influenced
by the magnitude of imperfect information and other transaction costs. It is for this
reason that theoretical and conceptual frameworks based on transaction cost
economics (TCE) and contract theory (CT) is used. These theoretical frameworks
were then applied to the mussel industry.
1.6 Motivation of the study
The general hypothesis within New Institutional Economics (NIE) is that institutions
are transaction cost-minimising arrangements that may change and evolve with
changes in the nature and sources of transaction costs (Kirsten and Sartorius, 2002).
Von Braun et al (1989) substantiate this by arguing that the formation of institutions
is a response to missing markets in an environment of pervasive risks, incomplete
markets and information asymmetry. NIE provides an illustration of how contract
6
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farming is used to cope with market failures that are due to information asymmetry,
hold-up problems, principal agent problems and prisoner's dilemma. It is argued that
NIE together with TCE, deal with most related transaction cost problems.
Kirsten and Sartorius (2002) pointed out that one of the reasons why firms emerge is
to economise on the transaction costs of market exchange and that the extent of
vertical integration" depends on the magnitude of these transaction costs. In this study
CT and the TC approaches are used to design a contract and to illustrate how Masiza
use contract farming to cope with high transaction costs.
This research aims at informing small growers, large growers, processors, the entire
agribusiness sector, empowerment programmes, and the Department of Agriculture
about mechanisms that can be put in place when addressing similar problems. In
addition, it yields more knowledge regarding the application of these theoretical
frameworks to empirical research and further serves as a stepping-stone for future
studies.
1.7 Methodology
The study follows a case study approach and therefore the following tasks must be
carried out in order to ensure the success of the study: field work and observation,
preparation for personal interviews and data collection, data analysis which entails
tabulating and categorising issues, analysis and interpretation. The study uses multiple
sources of data, namely: literature survey, personal interviews, fieldwork and
observations.
4 According to Rehber (1998), this occurs when a firm combines activities unlike those it currently
performs which are related to them in the sequence of marketing and production activities. It should
therefore be noted that agricultural forms of vertical integration include contract farming.
7
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1.7.1 Case studies
A case study approach has long been common and has recently been utilised in
several studies, for example, Hobbs (1996), Wang (2003) Masuku (2003), Sartorius
(2003) and Karaan (1999 and 2002).
Hobbs (1997) argues that most empirical studies regarding transaction costs have
been carried out on an individual industry level and on a narrower level, such as a
case study approach, which according to her is a much better approach than
investigating an issue on a multi-industry level. She argues that the multi-industry
level approach makes proper research difficult. The main problem associated with that
is the manner in which data are collected and the difficulty in obtaining valuable
relevant information.
Despite their ability (case studies) to present detailed information about an industry
and their relevance in problem solving on an industry level, case studies are criticised
for not being able to present a broader perspective or a general perspective on the
situation. It is argued that they only present a particular case, which might not be
applicable to other areas, and therefore cannot be used for policy formulation and
policy recommendations.
The Mussel Species with respect to Masiza Mussel Growers: The rationale behind
mussel farming is that mussels are efficient as filter feeders compared to other
shellfish. According to the study presented by Qisheng & Jianguang (2003), mussels
can filter 10-15 gallons of water a day, consuming absolutely everything in that water.
There are three basic methods used internationally to cultivate mussels, namely rope
culture (plastic ropes or mesh tubes hanging from the rafts), lantern net culture and
bottom culture.
Masiza together with Blue Bay use rope culture whereby mussels are clustered in
ropes (6m long) and covered by a net and then suspended from rafts. These rafts are
made of a wooden material and kept floating on the water. One raft carries about 311
ropes and each rope carries about 40-60 kg of mussels.
8
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Saldanha Bay, where Masiza and Blue Bay are located, is regarded as one of the best
areas particularly for shellfish farming in South Africa. This is due to the constant
flow of nutrients from the BenguelIa current, which is rich in nutrients; weather
conditions in the area also favour shellfish farming. Moreover the area is relatively
free from red tide disease, which rarely occurs but which can affect shellfish
(mussels) and destroys their quality.
It is reasonable to state that this bay has a global comparative advantage. The fact that
the production cycle for shellfish is much shorter than the production period in other
major foreign production areas, such as China, New Zealand (where most of the
South African imports come from), the Netherlands and China confirms that. The
mussels grow to market size in a period of 4 to 6 months, whilst it takes 18 months for
mussels to grow to market size in New Zealand, 24 months in Spain and 30 months in
the Netherlands (Karaan, 1999).
1.7.2 Data collection and field work survey
A literature review on contract farming, early and more recent experiences of contract
farming, fieldwork and personal interviews formed part of this investigation.
Fieldwork entailed direct interaction with relevant parties; this followed a
participatory and interactive approach, where the researcher worked closely together
with the three parties (Masiza, Blue Bay, and La Vie) for a period of two years. The
fieldwork was an ongoing process since the beginning of the project in June 2002
until the completion of this research. The fieldwork also helped in underpinning
socio-economic related factors as the way of characterising Masiza. This assisted the
researcher in gathering information on social capital issues such as culture, religion,
customs, tradition and trust regarding the parties.
In conducting the research a number of activities were undertaken; following the case
study method and procedures, a series of personal interviews with Masiza, La Vie and
Blue Bay were arranged. Blue Bay and La Vie were selected for interviews because
they are both core partners of this venture, the former being the main technical partner
9
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while the latter serves as the main market for Masizas products. The three parties are
the main participants in this venture.
No questionnaires were distributed, but open-ended questions were prepared in
advance to maintain logic and flow of relevant information from all relevant areas of
the project. Data were further examined to address the initial propositions of this
study. All participants were presented with similar questions during the interviews for
measurement purposes and consistency. This was an information-gathering exercise
intended to make a practical contribution to all the areas.
Several visits to the rafts (where production takes place) and to the processing
company were made. This enabled interaction with all the participants in the
industry. Field work was done so that the researcher could understand the industry
profile, and this entailed observing the attitudes of all the participants, observing their
personalities and characteristics, observing the actual transactions taking place and
recording all aspects relating to the transactions. It was also intended to ensure that
subjective analysis and unrealistic conclusions are avoided.
1.7.3 Measuring transaction costs
Milgrom and Roberts (1992) argue that it is difficult to distinguish transaction costs
from other managerial costs. While it is not easy to separate transaction costs, De
Bruyn (2001) argues that transaction costs can be separated from production costs;
according to him production costs are easily separated from normal managerial costs.
Mathiesen (2003a, 2003b, and 2003c) provides a clear distinction of these costs by
deriving transaction costs from other costs. This is shown in equations 1 and 2 below.
Therefore:
Ca=Pe+Te
Te =C, - Pe
Te =Ce - Me
(1)
(2)
Where Te = transaction costs,
Pe = production cost and
Ca = all costs
10
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Cc= co-ordination costs
Me = motivation costs
Equation 2 defines (TC) as the cost of co-ordination less motivation cost. While
equation 2 differentiates TC from other costs, it should also be borne in mind that
some TC cannot be observed, and therefore cannot be separated from other costs. This
distinction is important for the study for the basis of analysis and to avoid confusion.
Despite the fact that the costs of monitoring the actions of the buyer or seller and the
costs of valuing a good can be easily recognised, it is not easy to measure these costs
in financial terms. The difficulties of measuring transaction costs according to Hobbs
lie mainly in the manner in which data are collected. According to Delgado (1999) in
De Bruyn (2001), transaction costs in marketing and processing in Africa arise due to
the fact that market prices do not fully reflect true costs and returns for all market
actors.
Despite recognition of TCE, the theory has been criticised for its lack of empirical
support. De Bruyn (2001) argues that, despite the fact that transaction cost analysis
has been recognised as most suitable in dealing with transaction cost-related factors,
there is still a lack of empirical research.
The study by De Bruyn (2001) revealed that measurement of TC could be
accomplished by ranking TC attributes in relative terms. For example: if a particular
type of transaction cost is higher in situation A than in situation B and different
individuals consistently specify the same ranking whenever the two situation are
observed, then TC are measurable. Hobbs (1996) confirms this idea and further states
that it is only the effect and impact of TC on the institution that can be measured. The
absolute and monetary value of the actual transaction is difficult to measure.
According to her, this deficiency is attributed to the unavailability of data from firms
or industries.
Several techniques have been employed including both quantitative and qualitative
methods but none of them has ever been precise in its measurements. Econometric
11
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techniques measure the effect which is determined by the magnitude of the coefficient
in the regression (Hobbs, 1996).
Wang (2003) citing Joskow (1999), Shelanski and Klein (1995), Crooker and Masten
(1996), Masten and Saussier (2000), Boerner and Macher (200l), and Vannoni (2002)
argue that TC can be measured on the basis of:
1. the economic value of the resources used in locating trading partners and
executing transactions;
11. The differences between prices paid by the buyer and received by the seller.
In contrast with this view, Wang (2003) and Hobbs (1996) argue that in empirical
studies TC are not directly measured but relatively measured. This view emanates
from the Williamsonian approach that states that the absolute amount of the TC is not
important. What matters is the relative ranking of TC associated with different
contractual choices (market contract, risk management contract, resource provision
contract) within an organisation. To measure or benchmark the level or degree of
transaction costs, this study followed Williamson's approach.
Hence a conceptual framework was formulated with the focus on uncertainty,
transaction frequency, asset specificity, opportunism, bounded rationality, information
asymmetry, hold-up problem, principal agent problem and prisoner's dilemma as
identified during field work. The significant relationship between the chosen variables
makes it clear that economising on TC is the unifying logic behind various contractual
arrangements of production, marketing and resource provision. The degree of asset
specificity (eg, a high level of asset specificity requires very long-term contracts)
uncertainty and information asymmetry guides the researcher towards an appropriate
choice of contract with appropriate terms and duration.
1.7.4 Data analysis and interpretation
The main transaction considered in this study is that between Masiza and Blue Bay,
which entails exchange of resources, production equipment, technical advice,
mentoring support and service provision between the two parties. Following this is the
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transaction between Masiza and La Vie, which entails the exchange of fresh live
mussel produce. These transactions form the basis for analyses and hence are
identified as the unit of analysis and as benchmarks.
During data gathering several issues were identified and then grouped for the purpose
of data analysis. After grouping, the issues were then categorised, tabulated
accordingly and then analysed. In analysing this data a three point likert type scale
was used; 1 = constraint; 2 = neutral; and 3 = enhancement. These three
interpretations are also interpreted as; 1 = negative (-); 2 = neutral (0); and 3 =
positive (+) as adapted from Masuku (2003). In addition TCE and CT were used in
both in analysing data and interpreting results.
The researcher relied on the literature and practical experiences to present evidence in
various ways, using various interpretations of qualitative research as justified by
transaction cost analysis. Concerning contract enforcement, three factors were noted,
namely: the value of the relationship, the value of the actual transaction, and the cost
of enforcement. These factors helped to determine an appropriate enforcement
mechanism that is relevant for the existing relationship. The study largely adopted a
qualitative approach.
1.8 Outline of the study
Chapter one provides the background and an introduction of the study. Chapter Two
presents the background and market overview of the mussel product. Chapter Three
reviews the literature on contract farming where lessons from both national and
international experiences are presented. Chapter Four provides a theoretical
framework on CT and TCE. This chapter establishes the reasoning behind the choice
of CT, and TCE for this study.
Chapter Five provides a transaction costs analysis (TCA) where TC associated with
the industry are identified, verified, measured and discussed. This chapter attempts to
measure these TC, as this is considered useful in identifying the institutional response.
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This TC knowledge is used to design an appropriate contract. In this chapter an actual
plan is executed in which the conceptual framework as developed in chapter three and
four is applied to existing problems in the mussel industry. This application directs the
study towards the formulation of an appropriate and viable contract for Masiza.
Chapter Six provides types of contracts with enforcement mechanisms and
recommendations addressing problems highlighted in this study.
1.9 Study Area
The study was conducted in Saldanha Bay on the West Coast of the Western Cape
province. Both Masiza and Blue Bay are situated in this area, which is about 200 km
from the city of Cape Town. The processing company La Vie is about 30 km away
and located in a small town called Velddrif.
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CHAPTER TWO
OVERVIEW OF THE MUSSEL INDUSTRY
2.1 Introduction
The mussel industry is still one of the small and developing industries in South
Africa. This industry is based mainly in the Western Cape, with relatively low
production when compared to the production of other countries such as Denmark,
China, New Zealand and Spain, etc.
2.2 Market overview of mussel products in South Africa
The South African mussel production for year 2003 and 2004 is illustrated in Table
2.1 below. The entire production comes from Saldanha Bay (from Blue Bay and
Masiza), which is the only production area for mussels in the country (Pienaar, 2004).
Table 2.1: Industry output in year 2003/04 (tons)
Producers Output (t) Percentage (%)
Blue Bay Aqua-Farm 1000 90%
Masiza Mussel Growers 116 10%
Total 1116 100%
Source: Own calculations as adapted from PIenaar (2004)
Masiza and Blue Bay produces 1116 tons of mussels from 60 mussel rafts covering an
area close to their fully allocated 50 hectares; six of these rafts belong to Masiza.
According to Pienaar (2004) all the produce is consumed by the local market and still
remains in short supply. He feels that the market has grown bigger and is still
developing.
Because local production is insufficient for the local market, about one third of total
consumption is imported in the form of frozen and processed mussels each year, as
shown in Figure 2.1 below. Hence, projects such as Masiza still have a big role to
play. Pienaar (2004) believes local production will rise with the drive to give small
mussel farmers access to the industry. A brief mussel market break down is presented
in Figure 2.1 below.
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Processing factory
absorbs 75% of this
1116 t = (837 t)
Total live mussel
production
(1116t) 100%
Fresh live market
consumes 25% of
1116 t = (279 t)
Retail for processed
mussels = 837 t + 494 t
Retail for fresh
mussels = 279 t
Note: t = tons
Figure 2.1:
Source:
Market overview for mussel products
ITC (2003) and Visser (2004)
Figure 2.1 shows both fresh live and processed markets. Mussel markets, both fresh
and processed, are characterised by relatively insufficient output resulting in a supply
deficit. According to Pienaar (2004) the average mussel harvest has grown from 700
tons/year in 2000 and 2001 to 1116/annum in 2003 and 2004. This rise in output is
mainly attributed to the contribution made by new entrants such as Masiza. So far
these growers have contributed up to 10% of overall output to the industry, but this is
likely to increase as more rafts and other small growers come in (Pienaar, 2004).
It is important to note that fresh live mussels are mainly produced and consumed
locally, none are imported or exported. This is due to the fact that fresh live mussels
are extremely perishable and therefore cannot be transported for a period longer than
a day. This implies that South African producers are faced with the challenge of
ensuring that local demand is met. According to industry experts (Pienaar, 2004 and
Visser, 2004) this challenge has not been conquered due to the insufficient number of
producers resulting in insufficient supply in the market. Hence growers like Masiza
are encouraged to participate to meet the rising demand.
Despite the fact that the industry needs more participants, challenges and problems
associated with fresh live markets cannot be ignored. These problems exist because of
the nature of these markets. The market, particularly the fresh live market is such that
each grower should have reliable and transport to guarantee immediate transportation
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of mussels. Proper networks, communication facilities, managerial and business skills
are some of the essential requirements characterising this market. These are some of
the impediments inhibiting active participation of small growers such as Masiza in
this market.
2.3 Consumption
The consumption of mussels in South Africa is continuously rising. This, amongst
other things, is attributed to the fact that consumers in general are becoming more
health conscious, and regard fish products as carrying fewer health risks (Visser,
2004). Therefore the 279 tons of fresh mussels illustrated in Figure 2.1 above is
becoming insufficient. According to Pienaar (2004), the fresh market demands far
more than this amount, hence more production is required.
The processing factory currently absorbs between 800 to 900 tons of fresh produce for
further processing. Figure 2.1 shows that an average of 837 tons per year is produced;
implying that about 75% of the total local output is processed. This amount is then
redistributed to retailers. This processed output together with fresh live produce is
then supplied to the local market for local consumption.
According to ITC (2003) South Africa imported about 494 tons of processed mussels
in 2002. This, together with 837 tons of local produce, is supplied to the retail sector
resulting in a total consumption of 1331 tons per annum. This is also expected to rise
as the rise in demand continues. Brink (2001) as substantiated by Visser (2004)
argues that South Africa's production will increase as more new entrants are
becoming part of the industry. Most importantly Visser (2004) argues that South
Africa produces far better quality compared to other world producers and therefore
has better opportunities of commanding a big share in the local market.
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2.4 Major musselproducers in the world
This section presents volumes produced by some of the major world producers.
u
V
ol
m
e
(t)
South Africa France Netherlands Denmark New Zealand Ireland Chile
Country
Figure 2.2: Major world producers
Source: ITC (2003)
Despite South Africa's comparative advantage with regard to weather, environmental
conditions and relatively short production cycle, it still produces relatively small
quantities compared to other producers. This is mainly due to the fact that, the South
African mussel industry is not yet fully established. The industry is expected to grow
and command a relatively larger share in world production and possible enter the
export market.
It is argued that South Africa shows a great potential in mussel farming and what is
required are new entrants to participate, particularly small farmers. Karaan (2003)
pointed out that a great potential in mussel production also lies in small-scale
production. He further argued that mussel production could experience rapid
expansion, as new areas for small growers are made available in Saldanha Bay.
The major producing countries as listed in Figure 2.2 above are Denmark, New
Zealand, France, Netherlands and Chile. The mussel industry in New Zealand
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developed from a very slow beginning in the 1970s. But today's annual production in
the New Zealand mussel industry is estimated at over 75000 tons and more. The type
of mussel produced is green lip, which is the indigenous species of the country. The
industry is said to be highly mechanised both in production and processing (Hearn,
2002). Most of the mussels are sold frozen in halfshell. One of the reasons driving
exports in the New Zealand mussel industry is the surplus production which occurs
almost every year. Also China, Netherlands, Denmark and Ireland command a strong
position in the market, producing more than 100 000 tons a year (Bol, 2002;
Kristensen & Petersen, 2002; Prou and Goulletquer, 2002; Carroll, 2002; King, 2002).
2.5 SWOT Analysis for South African mussel industry
It is important for the study to ensure that a SWOT analysis is conducted, both for the
purpose of informing new entrants (Masiza) in the industry as well as existing actors
about strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats in the entire industry. Table
2.2 below addresses SWOT analysis of the mussel industry. This table also serves as
the basis for further analysis as carried out in Table 5.1 of Chapter five.
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Table 2.2: SWOT analysis of the mussel industry in South Africa
Strengths Opportunities
· It is a small industry with much market · Increasing number of hectares
potential · Increasing demand (Demand> Supply)
• Excellent quality · Opportunities for export market· Mussel is a high-value product • Expanding production
· It is easily consumed · Good government legislation, environmental· Healthy and nutrient rich product policies
· It is produced throughout the year, meaning · Productivity gains by small growers
continuity is assured · Entrepreneurial development· Saldanha is the arguably best area in the · Technological advancement, eg. Long lines,
world with relatively short production large rafts, hauling equipment.
periods, good weather and a suitable
environment (Karaan, 1999)
· Saldanha is a nutrient-rich coastal region
· The industry has few participants (mainly
large producers) & currently opening up
opportunities for new entrants
· Less production against huge demand
(Demand exceeds supply significantly)
Weaknesses Threats
· Lack of product awareness and lack of · Red-tide disease
promotional activities · Weather and environmental conditions
· Only one best area for production in South · Exchange rate (on imported resources)
Africa (Saldanha) · Imports· Access to finance • Entrepreneurial failure
· Bureaucracy
2.6 Concluding remarks
This chapter has presented an overview of the mussel market in South Africa. Mussel
production in relation to world production was explored. Major producing areas in the
world were presented. Subsequently, a swot analysis was presented as part of the
market overview, showing existing challenges and opportunities within the industry.
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CHAPTER THREE
LITERATURE REVIEW ON CONTRACT FARMING
3.1 Introduction
Contract farming can be defined as one means by which firms can exert control over
the production and marketing processes in order to reduce production and transaction
costs (Runsten and Key, 1996; Minot, 1986; and Katjiuongua, 2001). However,
contracting may displace the decision-making role of small-scale farmers to down-
stream processors or marketers, making farmers quasi-employees. Also, given the
high per unit cost of contracting with small farmers, who may also have greater
difficulty in meeting stringent quality and safety standards, contract farming may
favour large-scale farmers. According to Reardon and Barrett (2000) this can reduce
income and employment opportunities for smallholders.
Williamson (1975) argued that in order to reduce transaction costs, institutions are
created. Contract farming as an institutional design helps to reduce transaction costs.
According to Williamson (1975), these institutional arrangements decrease
uncertainty and risk, because they limit individual freedom of action. Williamson
argued that this makes the behaviour of market participants much more predictable.
Contract farming often includes a number of variations and multiple objectives, which
include welfare, political, social, and economic criteria. According to Kirsten and
Sartorius (2002) citing Sporleder (1992), and Runsten and Key (1996), a contract
could specify: (a) the price and the quantity, (b) the quality of products, (c) the
provision of the agribusiness inputs, (d) the provision of credit facilities, (e) the
conditions of production and delivery and grading requirements.
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3.2 The early experience with contract farming
Contract farming as an institution in agriculture has been in existence for a long time.
Countries like the United States and those in Central America engaged in this
institutional arrangement in various forms since the beginning of the zo" century
(Runsten and Key, 1996). The Japanese employed this arrangement to secure sugar
production in Taiwan since 1885 (Runsten and Key, 1996 and Rehber, 1998).
Between the 1930's and the 1950's many food and fibre sectors, particularly in the
United States and Europe, were involved in contract arrangements.
Industries like the fruit and vegetable industries increasingly made use of contract
farming. Furthermore merchants in Europe and North America entered into seed
production contracts with growers in Australia, Britain, Canada, France, Holland,
Hungary and the United States. A significant increase in contracting for vegetables,
fruits, nuts and seed crops was recognised by these countries during the 1950's. By
the late zo" century contract farming was widespread across Western Europe, the
United States and Japan (Rehber, 1998).
This institution has been recognised by several countries, including developing
countries, which see it as a vehicle to success. Both Eicher and Staatz (1998) in
Kirsten and Sartorius (2002) noticed an increasing effort by Asia, Latin America and
Africa to participate in and make use of this practice. This is because it looks
profitable and sustainable due to the higher returns earned by high-value export crops
and the impact of new technologies. Latin America has a much longer history than
Africa in that contract farming has been extensively promoted there since 1945 in a
series of import substitution programmes (Kirsten and Sartorius, 2002).
Little and Watts (1994) described a similar experience in Africa, where an increase in
contract farming in the fruit and vegetable canning sectors of colonial Africa was
recorded. This expansion was followed by a rapid increase in the period 1975-1985,
with some 60 schemes operating in 16 countries.
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On the African continent South Africa has a long history of farming under contracts,
which includes a wide range of sharecropping arrangements in the zo" century
(Bundy, 1979 in Kirsten and Sartorius, 2002). The recent studies show that vertical
co-ordination arrangements currently exist in the tea, fruit, sugar, flower, cotton,
vegetable, timber, fishing, barley and tobacco sectors.
3.3 The need for contract farming in developing countries
Contracting can reduce a participant's exposure to risk specifically in an open and
uncertain market. Processors and consumers increasingly demand a uniform product
of standard quality. This then implies that a contract is a vehicle that food processors
and marketers are using to respond to consumer preferences and to reward producers
who respond.
A cost benefit view of contracting is that farmers use contracts to increase their
income stability. Because most contractual arrangements reduce risk in comparison
with traditional production or marketing channels, a contracting farmer's resulting
income tends to be less variable over time. The farmer also benefits by having a
guaranteed market and price, as well as access to a wider range of production inputs
and technologies. This therefore means that farmers can also specialise their
management efforts on a particular part of the production process.
From the processor's perspective, it is argued that processors use contracts because
they need uniformity and predictability to suit consumers, but also they benefit from
lower costs in processing, packaging and grading. This benefit to the processor also
serves as a benefit to consumers in the form of a spill-over effect known as a positive
externality. This implies that, through savings from contracting arrangements by a
processor, a consumer can probably buy a product at a few cents per Rand less.
The trend toward contracting is part of a general shift in entrepreneurial functions
within agriculture. Most concern about this shift centres on resource control in
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agriculture and the impact of those that control resources on producers, suppliers,
price and income at various stages of the production and marketing process.
Given the poor performance of agriculture in many developing countries, particularly
in Africa, many donors and governments hoped that contract farming and its variants
would bring about improved incentives, increased income for farmers and positive
multiplier effects for impoverished rural economies. As a result there was
considerable growth in the number of contract farming schemes in the 1970s and
1980s. Most of these contract schemes and grower schemes were multipartite
arrangements involving private firms (Glover, 1994 in Von Braun and Kennedy,
1994).
Contract farming in developing countries has experienced mixed fortunes, yielding
some successes and many failures (Little and Watts, 1994; Runsten and Key, 1996).
In the African context, contract farming has been observed to disrupt power relations
within farm households, to exploit an unequal power relationship with growers, and
lead to growers becoming overly dependent on their contracts (Key and Runsten,
1999). Kirsten and Sartorius (2002) pinpointed several experiences and lessons from
contract farming, most of which are evident from the literature. These lessons
highlight a number of factors that determine the success of contract farming ventures.
3.4 Agribusiness and small farmers in developing countries
According to Royer (1995) and Pasour (1998), the changes in agricultural markets
have influenced the need for higher levels of managed co-ordination. According to
them, this has resulted in the introduction of different forms of vertical integration and
alliances which have become a dominant feature of agricultural supply chains.
Allied to these changes is a worldwide increase in consumer demand for differentiated
agricultural products that are relatively labour intensive. Looking at both food
demands and food safety issues, it is likely that these might be a cause for concern,
particularly in fresh food products and especially in developing countries. Fresh food
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products, which include fresh meat, seafood and fruits, account for half the value of
the total food and agricultural exports from developing countries (Unneveher, 2000).
However, it is often the well endowed and the skilled that have the ability to be part of
the co-ordinated marketing chains and alliances. There is therefore a danger that
quality standards, food safety rules of the consumers and the corporations in the
developed countries can act as effective barriers to participation in high-value chains
by small exporters and small producers. Only a small number of farmers in
developing countries have the ability to be part of these lucrative markets and for
them the reward can be substantial. As it is, several developed countries are denying
small farmers from developing countries the opportunity to sell, citing safety and
product standards as the reason (Unneveher, 2000).
Recent studies of the managerial economics of industrialised agriculture have
revealed new insights into the economic rationale for higher levels of managed co-
ordination as a choice of governance structure. In conjunction with this, the history of
vertical co-ordination projects in developing countries has provided many lessons and
reference frameworks against which future development can be evaluated
(Unneveher, 2000). All these could pioneer a new approach to improve our
understanding of the problems of market access facing farmers in developing
countries.
There is serious concern about the ability of small farmers and also small agribusiness
firms to survive in the medium term under these changing circumstances. However,
there still remain opportunities for small farmers to exploit. The major route for
continued survival will however be through exploiting other factors. One such factor
is a reliance on external rather than internal economies of scale through networking or
clustering and other forms of alliances. This could be done among small farmers or
through establishing links between small farmers and large enterprises that have
already overcome the major barriers to market entry. These links are usually
formalised through some form of contract, which is similar to contract farming
schemes implemented in developing countries.
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3.5 Contract farming and transaction cost in South Africa
This section outlines a number of problem areas which were addressed through the
application of transaction costs analysis and contract theory in South African
agriculture. Small farmers face several barriers and challenges (transaction cost-
related), which impede them from participating in mainstream agriculture.
A tangible solution to deal with this situation is therefore required from both the
government and the private sector. Karaan (1999, and 2002) provided several options
to address this situation. In his articles a case study for small mussel and oyster
growers was presented and several suggestions to bridge this gap between the
commercial and small sector such as small independent operators, contract farming,
franchising and vertical integration were documented.
Contract farming has also been a component of the most successful income-
generating projects for smallholders as well as an important earner of foreign
exchange in developing countries. Contract farming, together with TCE, has not really
taken root in South Africa. Few studies have directly addressed the issues of
contractual relations or contract farming in South Africa. Among those documented
studies is the work by Karaan (1999 and 2002) as stated above.
Tregurtha & Vink (1999) conducted their study on "Trust and supply chain
relationships". The main focus of their study was to show the difficulties that are
involved in building a trust-based relationship, particularly when looking at the cases
of small growers and large firms. Small barley growers in the North West Province
were studied and South African Breweries was the main partner. A study by Masuku
(2003) on contractual relationships between small cane growers and millers in
Swaziland also covered a great deal of ground with regard to this subject.
A study by Mutungul (2000a) that was conducted in two Kwa-Zulu Natal districts on
household decisions relating to the sources of purchased food (as cited by Makhura,
2001) also contributed to this subject. Makhura (2001) focused on determining the
26
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
influence of transaction costs on farmers' choices of marketing channels in the
Northern Province. Hardman et al. (2002) also conducted a study on improving co-
operation in the South African fresh apple industry. The study investigated aspects of
co-operation between South African producers, packers and exporters in the Western
Cape and Langkloof East areas in 2001. This study showed areas where more
resources should be committed to make the SA fruit and apple export value chain
more competitive.
The study by Meissenheimer et al (2000) was conducted in the Western Cape wine
industry to identify sources of transaction costs in the South African wine supply
chain. The study examined possible transaction costs which induce inefficiencies and
constrain the global competitiveness of the supply chain. In addition there is a study
by Sartorius and Kirstern (2002) where they looked at how to link small scale farmers
to agri-business. Sartorius (2003) looked at the economics and application of contracts
using different case studies and contributed to the South African pool of knowledge
with regard to transaction costs and contract application.
3.6 Types of contracts
Contracts can be of various types, which include:
1. Marketing contracts: These are sometimes called market specification
contracts. Rehber (1998) and Hobbs (1996) further explain them as the case
where the producer sells the raw commodity to the processor at a specified
price, method of payment, quality and time. In this type of contract the
producer has full autonomy regarding production decisions. It is important to
note that there is risk transfer together with the decision of when to sell and
how to market the product. The seller transfers some risk together with the
decision of when to sell and how to market the product to the buyer. Despite
this transfer, control over the production process remains with the seller.
11. Resource-providing contracts: These are contracts specifying some measure
of company control. In this type of contract certain company resources can be
supplied and there is a measure of company control. The producer agrees to
produce the raw commodity under some degree of company control and
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specification as well as to sell the commodity to the processor at an agreed
price, quality and time (Rehber, 1998; Wolz and Kirsch, 1999 in Kirsten and
Sartorius, 2002). That is, the integrator provides production resources with
certain conditions and managerial assistance and supervision. Product prices
are usually based upon spot markets and income guarantees to the producers
are minimal.
To be precise, more control lies with the buyer where the buyer provides a
market outlet for the product, supervises the production and supplies key
inputs (Hobbs, 1996). In addition to Rehbers (1998) description, Hobbs
(1996) confirms that it is often the buyer who may own the product, while the
seller is paid according to the volume of output. She regards this type of
contract as the contractual arrangement closest to full vertical integration; for
example, a feed manufacturer might contract with animal producers, supplying
feeds, overseeing production methods and the marketing of the finished
animals (Hobbs, 1996).
Ill. Production management contracts: This type of contract includes full
company control as well as the provision of company inputs. In this regard,
complete control of the production process passes to the integrator, who will
supervise production, provide the necessary inputs and services, and
remunerate the producer for the raw commodity at an agreed price (Rehber,
1998). These types of contracts, which are sometimes referred to as
management and income guaranteeing contracts, often include the production
and marketing stipulations of the former two types. In addition, market and
price risks are transferred from farmers to integrators. On the other hand, the
integrator takes a substantial part of the managerial responsibility from the
farmers.
A fair contract should contain reciprocal obligations with a balance between
the rewards and the risks accruing to each party. A production contract should
at least contain the following provisions: (a) define the parties, (b) specify the
type and quality of the produce, (c) state the quantity of the produce, (d) state
clearly the responsibilities of both parties concerning production and
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marketing practices, (e) indicate the manner, including timing of delivery or
collection, (f) determine the price (specific or formula) or other consideration,
and indicate the effects of variations in quality, quantity, or manner of delivery
and also specify the manner and timing of payment. It is recommended that an
arbitrator be appointed or otherwise the way disputes are to be resolved should
be specified.
3.7 Advantages and disadvantages of contract farming in agriculture
3.7.1 Advantages to producers
The enthusiasm of donors about the benefits of contracting in developing countries
has resulted in inflated expectations of the potential of this institution (Little, 1994 in
Von Braun and Kennedy, 1994). Nevertheless, there are benefits to the farmer, which
Roy (1963) described. Contracting allows farmers to overcome the barriers of entry
into specific sectors.
Farmers usually enter into contracting production in order to reduce transaction costs
and gain access to information, technology, marketing channels, managerial skills,
technical expertise, access to plant and equipment and patented production procedures
(Carney, 1998; Royer, 1995 and Delgado, 1999). Contracting could also improve
access to capital and credit. This is a major concern of most farmers and especially so
in developing countries. Farmers may be prepared to relinquish their autonomy for the
sake of being able to produce and secure markets and support services.
Contracting farmers can reduce production costs and increase production and income
as a result of their use of new technology and their access to company resources. The
reduction in cost is due to better technology, better collective decision making, and
reduced transport and marketing costs (Hennesy, 1996; Pasour, 1998 and Royer,
1995).
Contracting farmers can reduce marketing risks and stabilise income, and in this sense
the integrator provides a form of insurance (Runsten and Key, 1996; Wolz and Kirch,
1999; Colchoa, 1999; Sofranko et al., 2000). At the same time contracts may simplify
production and marketing. Contracting farmers can increase profit opportunities
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through a greater product range, diversification and differentiated products (Korovkin,
1992; Von Braun and Kennedy, 1994; and Delgado, 1999). There is widespread
evidence of an improvement in farmer income in developing countries as a result of
contracting (Levin, 1988). In addition, the educational experience of interacting with
an agribusiness partner can provide a platform for farmers in developing countries
who are attempting to convert from subsistence to commercial farming (Sofranko et
al.,2000).
3.7.2 Disadvantages to producers
Most of the critiques against contract farming relate to the disadvantages to the
farmers embedded in contractual arrangements. These disadvantages include farmer's
loss of autonomy, increased production risk, increased market power of
agribusinesses, increased concentration of production and insuring instances, and
reduced producer income. There is a universal loss of autonomy as farmers operate
under a centralised control system and the contracted farmer is sometimes reduced to
little more than a hired hand (Schrader, 1986; Korovkin, 1992; Morvaridi, 1995; and
Sofranko et al., 2000).
A further source of criticism is related to increased production risk in that the farmer
must meet the contractual obligations of the integrator (Royer, 1995). In this sense,
risk can also increase in that the farmer invests in highly specific fixed production
assets, combined with the non-assurance of a permanent contract or the chance that
the integrator may default. Production risk is increased especially when the farmers in
developing countries diversify out of traditional crops into non-traditional crops
where the technology has not been developed or adapted locally (Runsten and Key,
1996)
Runsten and Key (1996) argued that contracting universally increases land use
intensity, which can lead to higher levels of pollution. Contract farming in developing
countries can result in decreased food production and increased food security
problems as a result of the concentration on contract crops (Morvaridi, 1995 and
Rehber, 1998).
30
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
It is accepted that prices paid to the contractor will be less than spot market prices
because of the reduction in marketing risk to the farmer and the increased market
power of the contracting firm. The result can be reduced income, as shown by Pas our
(1998). This situation might especially penalise a contracted farmer with high levels
of capitalisation and managerial skills where an open market exists for the same crop
(Runsten and Key, 1996). Moreover, contract production often involves a high-cost
package of inputs that require financing facilities.
The change in cost structure is especially marked in developing countries when
farmers diversify out of the traditional crops and can negate the effect of increased
revenue (Von Braun et al., 1989). Farmers incur additional cost because of the need
to co-ordinate their production to suit the integrator, as well as to liase for the use of
company inputs and services (Glover, 1987).
3.7.3 Contract enforcement
Although contract farming involves a written agreement between farmers and the
agribusiness firm, these contracts are seldom legally enforceable in practice (Grosh,
1994). The poorly developed legal institutions in developing countries contribute to
high transaction costs in prosecuting individual smallholders for breach of contract.
Enforcing a contract also leads to a souring of the relationship between farmers and
the firm as well as between the agribusiness and the community.
Adding to these high costs in terms of financial and community relations, one may
find that in many countries contracts are often viewed as not legally enforceable. Thus
the only real penalty at the disposal of the contracting firm is to discontinue the
contract with those farmers not complying with its terms and then to write off lost
income.
Because of these costs, firms deal only with growers who are less likely to default
who are often the larger growers, and they are thus required to screen applicants.
These screening and enforcement costs are fixed costs and can be minimised by
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reducing the number of contract farmers, which also has the effect of favouring larger
growers (Key and Runsten, 1999).
Farmers sometimes breach contract either on account of production failure or because
they have sold the produce to competing buyers. When there is a good market at
harvest, many farmers are lured by higher spot prices where they can sell their
produce for cash. In this way they, avoid the repayment of credit, which is usually
subtracted at the time of delivery. The farmer often claims production failure for the
lack of compliance with the contract. The absence of effective legal systems and lack
of collateral held by small farmers, as well as weak insurance markets, create
considerable risk for companies engaging in contract farming with smallholders,
again creating barriers preventing entry to agricultural markets for some smallholders
(Kherallah, 2000).
In resolving the problem of farmer default, agribusiness has developed a number of
innovative mechanisms to deal with this problem. These mainly focus on high-value
crops. These mechanisms include:
1. lending through groups,
II. good communication and close monitoring,
Ill. range and quality of services offered
IV. incentives, and
v. co-operation between buyers.
In the absence of public mechanisms for contract enforcement, private enforcement
mechanisms can be effective. A study by Gow et al (2000) has shown that the use of
internal private mechanisms for contract enforcement through contractual
arrangements between two parties in an exchange can make contracts self-enforcing.
This is mainly through trust-based relationships. The introduction of contract
innovations and associated support programmes in this case study induced output and
productivity growth in both the agribusiness and the farmers. An input provision and
investment facilitation programme was introduced for farmers who signed long-term
contracts with the company. In other parts of the developing world, one finds that
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legal institutions do not play an important role in the enforcement of contracts. An
analysis by Fafchamps and Minten (1999) suggested that trust-based relationships are
the dominant contract enforcement mechanism under these circumstances.
Trust is established primarily through the repeated transactions of the contracted
parties. Trust and social networks are usually the mechanism by which the
transactions and contractual arrangements in developing countries are enforced and
thus provide another alternative to be considered in reducing contract default
(Masuku,2003).
With many agribusiness firms controlled by multinational interests often from a
different ethnic group, usually related to previous colonial regimes, one would expect
that trustworthy relationships would be hard to come by. Striving towards establishing
trust-based relationships is however, still important for purposes of self-enforcement.
3.8 The objectives of different actors and the constitution of the contract
Contract farming is attractive to foreign aid agencies for many of the same reasons
that it appeals to national governments. It provides a regulated system for channelling
large amounts of money straight to smallholders. It also provides for the transfer of
technology. The other motive is profit. The Commonwealth Development
Corporation (CDC) and the World Bank have pioneered some very successful
smallholder components to make them politically acceptable and able to qualify for
funding. Baumann, (2000) found that a major problem with contract farming is that
different partners in the projects may have different objectives and these are often not
clarified.
Table 3.1 below shows three different role players with their aims and objectives in
specific circumstances. The collaboration of these different role players is essential in
order to ensure the success of the project, as illustrated in the table below.
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Table 3.1: Objectives of a smallholder programme
Farmers Government CDC
1. Secure food supply 1. Increased production of 1. Farmers and governments
priority food and cash crops able to achieve objectives
2. Increased income from sale of 2. Maximum net foreign 2. Sustainable economic
cash crop exchange earnings or savings development from investment in
cash crops
3. Improved standard of social 3. Minimum cost to national 3. Recovery of loan funds and
services exchequer interest payments from projects
4. Minimum utilisation of own 4. Maximum rural employment
resources generation
5. Minimum exposure to risks of 5. Improved social facilities and
indebtedness, crop failure, rural infrastructure. Impact on
imposed authority growth in areas surrounding
projects
Source: Baumann (2000)
3.8.1 Objectives of private contractors
All crops that are conducive for contracting have economies of scale in infrastructure,
processing and transport. Many of them were traditionally grown in plantations and
estates for this reason. Grower schemes that allow the company to delegate
production to smaller farmers have several advantages. The contract assures the
company of regular inputs of raw material from the small farmer so that it is able to
meet its economies of scale. They would not be able to achieve this through purchases
on the open market (Little and Watts, 1994).
Contracts can specify planting dates as well as total quantity to be delivered. The
contract therefore both reduces the uncertainty and gives the company control of the
production process. Furthermore, the company does not have to invest in land, hire
labour or undertake large-scale farming operations. Some companies and parastatals
retain a nucleus estate surrounded by growers, especially when the economies of scale
of the processing plant depend on a certain volume of throughput.
Many companies have withdrawn from production completely, delegated
responsibility for processing, and retained control of only the most critical stages of
34
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
marketing. Avoiding conflict over land ownership and labour issues is an important
advantage of the contract, whatever the level of integration of the company.
Little and Watts (1994) argued that not only does contract farming allow potential
problems with labour to be avoided, but it allows the company to profit from self-
exploitation of family labour. Apart from these economic reasons, there are several
political reasons why contract farming is attractive to private companies. It allows the
company to avoid investing too much resources in a country and therefore to avoid
the risk of expropriation.
Contract farming as a smallholder-friendly scheme can be good for the public image
of a company and give the impression that it is progressive. This can be exploited by
the company to encourage the state or even international aid agencies to provide
credit for operating capital or for the rehabilitation of plantations.
3.8.2 Objectives of governments
It is argued that contract farming is usually politically very attractive to both
government and investors. They avoid foreign ownership of large tracts of land and
may also create the impression that other features associated with plantations, such as
the enclave effect, are avoided. Grower schemes may also appeal to governments
who, whilst realising the political necessity of addressing the needs of the
smallholder, prefer to keep them under a central authority.
Ellman (1986) in Kirsten and Sartorius (2002) stated that some aims of government
are to increase cash and food crop production, maximise rural employment
generation, and to improve social facilities and rural infrastructure. However these
often clash with implicit objectives which are to:
1. Accord political acceptability to a plantation type project;
ii. Mobilise cheap family labour for production; and
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iii. Move reluctant farmers from a heavily populated area to an under-populated
area. Grower schemes are often linked to and facilitate resettlement schemes.
Glover and Kusterer (1990) in Kirsten and Sartorius (2002) argued that contracting
has a trade-off for policy makers, even if their objective is solely to promote rural
development. The contracting relationship is not a zero sum game because the
distribution of benefits between the firm and its growers can affect the total
magnitude of benefits available. For example, a bank may supply credit to growers
and expect high producer prices so that the growers can repay their debt.
3.8.3 Objectives of growers
The primary motive for smallholders to become contract growers is market access and
increased income from the sale of crops with an acceptable level of risk. Local
markets are highly volatile and prices can drop within days. International markets are
more stable than local ones, but they are inaccessible without specific channels such
as those provided by grower schemes. Small growers are often reluctant to adopt new
technologies because of the risks involved.
Furthermore, there is no guaranteed supply of inputs such as fertiliser and agro-
chemicals from government, and public extension services are often poor. Contract
farming provides the smallholder with access to these technologies and with either
private or priority treatment from the public extension service. The company has a
large vested interest in ensuring that the smallholder has access to these services. It
also gives them access to credit, which is one of the most frequently stated reasons for
smallholders to become growers (Kirsten and Sartorius, 2002).
3.8.4 The constitution of the contract
There are three observations that are useful to bear in mind when composing
contracts:
1. A contract is the means by which risk is distributed between the grower
and the contractor;
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11. A contract is the representation of a relationship rather than the
relationship itself (Baumann, 2000) and related to this, the constitution and
administration of a contract are highly dependent on the political and
economic environment in which it is embedded. Contracts can be thought
of as varying in intensity between those that pay the market price on
delivery and those in which every detail, including the production process
and price, is fixed (Glover and Kusterrer, 1990 in Kirsten and Sartorius,
2002);
iii. The division of value added between the grower and the contractor is
determined by the policy objectives of the scheme, crop characteristics and
the alternative markets available to them. Table 3.2 outlines the typical
rights and obligations in contracts.
Table 3.2: Rights and obligations of farmers and the principal in smallholder
contracts
Farmer Obligations Principal Obligations
1. Use land for purposes specified in a contract 1. Supply credit and inputs
2. Following production regulations specified in a 2. Provide technical and managerial support
contract
3. Maintain internal farm roads and drains 3. Maintain infrastructure
infrastructure
4. Sell crop through project authority 4. Purchase all production of acceptable quality
5. Repay loans 5. Pay farmer according to agreed formula
6. Maintain accounts in a comprehensible form
Farmer's rights Project authority's rights
1. Timely receipt of services and payments 1. Timely recovery of payment for services
specified as obligations of project authority provided to farmers
2. Compensation in the event of default by project 2. Purchase of crop as specified in a contract and
authorities on any of its obligations imposition of penalties in the event of default
Source: Baumann (2000)
The contract should in theory specify in detail the rights and obligations between the
growers and the firms, including the penalties for breach of contract by either side.
However Glover (1987) stated that few contracts are perfectly contingent and most
are vulnerable to misinterpretation. Baumann (2000) referred to the example in
Kaleya, a project in Zambia, where smallholders had to sign an 18-page agreement
which specifies their obligations. The company in return endeavours to arrange
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certain services, but there is no corresponding clause protecting farmers in case of the
company defaulting. The Kenyan Tea Development Authority (KTDA) has no formal
contract, which leaves the growers dependent on the goodwill of the project authority.
This has so far been successful largely because of mutual dependencies and the
support the KTDA has received from its partner.
Contracts tend to be more favourable for smallholders when the processor is heavily
dependent on the smallholder for a steady flow of raw material. Nevertheless, even
those contracts which are among the best fail to specify appropriate penalties for non-
performance of obligations, clear explanation of the price formula, the procedure for
paying growers and a procedure for independent arbitration.
A commercial contract - at least in the initial period - will try to ensure that it has the
best possible arrangement for exploiting the resources of growers. In the initial phase
of the project the growers will be attracted by price, credit and technical incentives
offered by the company. Companies do offer these in the initial phases of the project
and then lock growers into production through exploitation gaps in the contract
(Baumann, 2000). Some contracts for example prevent growers from seeking other
opportunities and force them to stay in the existing contract regardless of up-coming
opportunities.
Contractors, whether commercial or private firms, frequently have long waiting lists
of growers who would like to join their schemes and are therefore able to be
demanding in their requirements. Hence, they can often specify the assets that the
applicant should have, the level of experience with the crop, the availability of labour
to produce the crop and secure title to land and education.
Many of these requirements eliminate poorer farmers and the selection is often
dependent on interviews and patronage ties. The contract can also specify the age and
marital status of a grower. Baumann (2000) referred to a Ghanaian example of oil
palm growers, where a grower had to be married with children and be able to direct
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their family labour to the production of the oil palm. The contract and any debts
incurred under this are subsequently inheritable and transferable.
The contract can also specify the amount of land which can or should be put under the
contracted crop. For example the Kenyan Tea Development Authority specifies a
limit to the area for tea production in order to ensure that the labour to harvest it is
sufficient and therefore maintain quality output.
Most problems which are incurred under contract farming are a consequence of the
contingent nature of the contract and manipulation on both sides, rather than the terms
which are written into the contract. The relative dependencies of the contractor and
grower are extremely important in deciding how contracts are administered. The most
common problem for the contractors is that they are unable to maintain their
monopoly of the market and other buyers appear and offer a better price. The contract
usually safeguards the contractor from such eventualities by specifying levels of
production, deducting costs in advance and supplying credit (Baumann, 2000).
A further problem is that another contractor moves into the area to offer growers a
better deal and takes advantage of the investment the pioneer company has injected
into technical know-how and infrastructure development. Companies can also face
problems from manipulation of the product, for example adding stones or objects for
weight, adulterating procedures as revenge, and using patronage ties to upgrade
produce and to divert inputs intended for contracted crops elsewhere. Watts (1990) in
Kirsten and Sartorius (2002) have found that companies also use informal ties to
enforce contracts and ensure grower loyalty when legal and property rights are
difficult to control.
3.9 Crop characteristics for contract farming
One of the factors in contract farming which is often debated is whether contract
farming is commodity specific? What influence does the crop have on the nature and
effectiveness of the project? Binswanger and Rosenzweig (1986) argued that
technological conditions and crop characteristics combine to give rise to situations in
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which contract farming is the most viable option. This is specifically true for crops
where important economies are associated with processing and co-ordination. In
particular perennials need much maintenance and take a long time to mature. This is a
reason why specific crops are grown under contract. Commodities grown under
contract are often grown to specifications linked to grade and quality standards that
allow the commodity to be classified and priced. Kirsten and Sartorius (2002) used
tropical tree crops as an example in drawing the link between the technology of
production and organisational structure. They argue that the characteristics of
perennial tropical tree crops favour production in organisations that have a rigid and
hierarchical authority structure and a division of labour according to tasks and
functions. The need for such an organisation is more pronounced the greater the
investment, the newer the crop and the more demanding and less commercialised the
growers are.
Goldsmith (1985) in Kirsten and Sartorius (2002) isolated the following technical
requirements which contribute to the development of a contract system:
i. Perishability: if one cannot store the crop then a stable market is necessary
ii. Bulkiness: high value per unit and profitable to transport
III. Permanence: if one cannot abandon or alter the crop, then a guaranteed market
is required;
IV. Processing: the need for processing creates dependence which can be
exploited;
v. Variations in quality: contracting is encouraged where crops vary in quality
and quality is important for processing.
However, whilst it is clear that crop characteristics influence technologies and
production strategies, the form of labour attached to a commodity is often best
explained by the larger political environment. It is also relevant to consider the types
of contracts which different crop characteristics give rise to and how these are shaped
by social relations.
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Furthermore, crop characteristics can affect household welfare (if there is gender
division of labour and displacement of food crops), regional development,
sustainability and future development (is there technology transfer; do growers remain
dependent, etc).
Examples of crop characteristics and how they influence contract farming
Processing: The type of processing which a crop needs has an impact on the
contracts and production relations under which it is grown. If a crop needs quick
processing, growers are particularly vulnerable to the terms stated by the contractor, if
they have no alternative place to take the crop. The fixed capital assets represent a
high proportion of the cost of processing, so the profitability of the firm depends
largely on the ability to operate very close to plant capacity.
The importance of quality: The importance of quality in the product also has a
bearing on production procedures. In some cases this will be through the transfer of
technology to the growers and an investment in their ability to farm. Extension
officers visit the growers and transfer some of the skills required for plant
establishment. In other cases, the company will specify uniform production
procedures which are not easily transferable and which do not build on the growers'
indigenous knowledge of their microenvironments. In other cases there is very little
technology transfer.
Labour intensity and frequency: The labour intensity of the crop and the frequency
of labour input needed have an enormous effect on how it is produced. For example,
tea has been heralded as the perfect contract crop because it is labour intensive
throughout the year and yields a monthly income. The effect of labour intensity and
frequency is therefore likely to depend on what role the contract crop plays in the
larger farming and social system.
Regularity of income: Crops like tea are attractive crops for small farmers because
they receive a monthly cash income compared to the annual payments received from
other crops.
Switching costs: The shifting costs associated with different crops are the costs to the
producer of switching to a new buyer (Glover, 1984 in Kirsten and Sartorius, 2002).
These costs have been identified as the principal determinant of agricultural
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marketing structures and the credit systems associated with them. If the costs are low,
producers would be free to choose their buyers. However, buyers will not extend
credit because they will have no assurance that this will be paid back or that they will
reap the benefits of technical assistance to growers.
If switching costs are high, a permanent producer-buyer relationship can develop, but
there will be no assurance that the buyers will not appropriate the benefits. The' ease
with which growers can switch is heavily influenced by the ease with which product
quality can be assessed, the perishability of the product and the need for purchased
inputs.
3.10 Financial and economic implications of contract farming
The economic case for smallholders rests on three arguments, according to Tiffen and
Mortimore (1990) in Kirsten and Sartorius (2002):
1. Small farms tend to use more labour and produce more output per unit of land
than estates;
ii. Owners tend to use more labour and produce more per unit of land than
tenants;
iii. Income inequalities tend to hinder technology diffusion, while encouraging
mechanisation on estates in labour-surplus countries, where labour-intensive
technology would be more appropriate.
In general, smallholders do have a lower ratio of fixed working capital to land owned,
so economic efficiency would indicate a strategy of lower purchased inputs and lower
output. They lower wage costs because of their ability to use family labour and they
ignore minimum wage legislation and may therefore be able to compensate for lower
capital intensity with higher labour intensity. A stable income is high on their list of
priorities, so they may avoid dependence on a single crop, and because they have a
smaller proportion of fixed costs, they have a greater ability to change production
when the market turns. They are also less able to invest in upgrading their production
(Tiffen and Mortin, 1990 in Kirsten and Sartorius, 2002). There are few smallholder
projects that are able to sustain themselves without government or development
agency support.
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The accumulated evidence suggests that smallholders are not efficient if judged only
by yield per hectare. However, economic efficiency is not only a matter of returns to
land. Smallholders can adopt a low-input and low-output strategy and continue
making a profit at prices that would not be economically viable for estates. Such
flexibility offers the possibility of efficient resource allocation in response to the
diversification of economic opportunities in the developing and urbani sing
economies, as well as being a form of insurance against the uncertainties inherent in
world markets (Tiffen and Mortin, 1990 in Kirsten and Sartotius, 2002).
The political case for smallholder contracting rests not only on efficiency, but also on
equity considerations in the distribution of land and in the regional knock on effects
that smallholdings generate. There is mixed evidence in relation to the relative
benefits of smallholder farming. Many of the institutions such as CDC, which
supported contract farming as a development activity are withdrawing their
involvement from commercially unattractive projects. Baumann (2000) pointed out
that the capital costs of smallholder development projects have often been ignored. A
higher social and economic benefit may actually be achieved by spreading the
investment around a larger number of people rather than concentrating it all on a few
projects.
3.10.1 Capital investment
Contract farming usually involves a variety of factors including international
agencies, government ministries and private firms. In some cases the roles that these
actors play are so intertwined that it is difficult to classify the scheme in any sector.
This raises some important questions in assessing the financial viability and
sustainability of smallholder schemes.
I. How is risk shared within these projects? For example, sometimes producers
receive public credit at a subsidised rate to help them cope with market risks.
ii. Does contracting with local producers allow foreign firms to shift the burden
of financing crop production onto local governments and international aid
agencies and benefit from indirect subsidised loans? (i.e targeted
subsidization) .
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Usually the capital investment levels per hectare and per farmer in contracting
projects are high. But this is especially so in settlement schemes where the land and
infrastructure have to be developed.
The major sources of finance for smallholders are governments, local banks, local
companies and international agencies. The types of finance used include grants, loans,
equity investments, services provided in kind and self-generated funds (Baumann,
2000). Few smallholder projects have more than token equity investment because of
the riskiness of the venture from the point of view of the funding agency, and the
availability of loan finance rather than equity capital.
Baumann (2000) found that a problem with the financial structure of the projects
which they studied was the high debt to equity ratio. This exposed the projects to
financial risk, and the concentration of equity capital, where it existed, in the
processing unit introduces the risk of conflict between the producer and processor.
3.10.2 Marketing and price
Contract farming represents the converse of free market forces. Contract farming
schemes usually arise because of imperfections in the market environment that do not
allow normal price signals to regulate supply. In many cases the market niche is either
so narrowly defined or so unfamiliar that growers would not produce the crops unless
they were under contract in a vertically integrated market system (Baumann, 2000).
Thus contract farming is in fact a response to market imperfections. The contracting
scheme then tries to internalise the market for the commodity and avoid market
competition. A market monopsony' is an essential component of contract farming, as
it is the only way to ensure that companies can secure a return on their money. This
can be difficult with crops like coffee, which are relatively easy to process and to
market independently.
5 Monopsony is a state in which demand comes from one source. If there is only one customer for a
certain product, that customer has a monopsony in the market for that product (Moffatt (2004).
44
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
It is usually when farmers begin to behave as free market actors, selling their goods to
the highest bidder that contract schemes run into problems. Many companies often
depend on the state to ensure that they receive a market niche that is protected from
too much competition.
If switching costs for producers are high, then contractors can be assured that they
will have a return on their investment, but the producer will have less bargaining
power over price. The switching costs of crops are highly dependent on crop
characteristics such as the level of inputs required, perishability, the need for
processing, and the ease with which quality can be assessed.
Many producers do in fact have only one channel through which they can sell their
produce. This is not necessarily adverse for the producers, because they have a
guaranteed market for any amount of production of acceptable quality. However, it
can leave the producer in a weak bargaining position on price and vulnerable to
manipulation by project authorities.
Market fluctuation presents a major problem for most commodities grown under
contract. Many are grown in special market niches that are vulnerable to international
market swings, and boom bust cycles. There has been a general decline in the terms of
trade for plantation crops as compared to manufactured goods. Prices are also
characterised by volatility, which is in part a consequence of the difficulty of
adjusting to price changes. Smallholders are likely to respond to price swings by
shifting their resources into another area of production. Contractors often try to
prohibit this diversification, but for smallholders in a volatile market doing so may be
essential for survival and risk management.
3.10.3 Pricing formulas
The main factor encouraging smallholders to join contract farming schemes is the
price the authorities will pay for the product, and a guaranteed market. This has
widely been accepted as one of the best guarantees of success in a contract-farming
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scheme. There is plenty of empirical evidence that smallholders will drop production
of a crop if at all possible, when the price falls (Baumann, 2000). There are also
instances where smallholders will continue to produce despite conflicts with the
management and difficult conditions, if the price paid for their crop is good, the
market guaranteed and payment prompt.
Much of the success of smallholder projects depends on whether the contractor is
willing or able to meet these requirements. Much therefore also depends on what
alternative markets are available to smallholders and the nature of the dependency on
the producer. The price the contractor pays for a product is often dependent on
quality. This can work as an incentive if the producers feel their work is rewarded.
However, crop quality, consistency and standards are often the most contentious
factors in a contract. They are easy for the contractor to manipulate in order to push
down the price offered for produce.
For example, if the yield for a particular crop is unusually high, the contractor may
raise its quality standards so that it can reject those crops which it does not want. The
company can also delay collection times for produce and then lower the price if the
value of the produce decreases. Companies cannot, however, get away with this
manipulation indefinitely. The uncertainty over rejection removes the risk-reducing
incentive for smallholders and lessens its value. Smallholders will diversify and
abandon production if they do not receive an adequate price. Companies and
governments have therefore tried to counter the volatility of the market and find ways
to stabilise the price. A good price formula can help in sharing the costs and benefits
between producer and processor.
3.10.4 Credit
Access to credit is one of the key incentives for smallholders in joining contract-
farming schemes. Credit can be extended in cash, in kind or in the advance of services
or capital inputs. Loans are usually given on the security of the land or the anticipated
value of the crop. Loan recoveries are usually made from crop sales or as service
charges. Sometimes the farmers obtain loans separately from an existing national
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credit agency or bank, in which case the contract itself can serve as collateral. Glover
(1987) has found that trans-nationals are increasingly reluctant to finance contract
growers and have attempted to persuade state banks to assume this responsibility. The
advance of credit is a vital part of contract farming and often the only way the
smallholder can enter the market.
There are several recurring problems with credit which appear in the empirical
literature. One is that credit is only advanced for the contracted crop, whereas farmers
may need the money to settle non-crop expenses such as school fees, etc. This has
been found to be a major complaint amongst several farmers. Nyoro and Whitter
(1986) in Baumann (2000) mentioned coffee farmers in Kenya, who have taken loans
to finance non-coffee expenditure.
Many of the studies in Africa mentioned the lack of credit for small farmers as a
major problem for the welfare of smallholders. Most projects discourage or forbid
diversification, because it reduces the throughput of the main crop and it is more
difficult for projects to recover debts from the sale of other crops (Glover, 1987).
A second major problem with credit is that smallholders can be locked into a
deteriorating debt situation. A grower may enter into a contracting relationship and
then be unable to terminate it if the company or project deducts payments and the
expected returns do not materialise. In such a situation a grower may have to stick to
the same company and is effectively at their managerial mercy.
3.11 Concluding remarks
This Chapter firstly defined contract farming, types of contracts and vertical co-
ordination in agriculture. The role of and reasons for increased contract farming in
agriculture were also documented. This Chapter also showed advantages,
disadvantages and lessons of contract farming from other developing countries. It
further demonstrated the relevance and application of transaction cost theory and
contract theory to emerging agriculture in South Africa.
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CHAPTER FOUR
CONTRACT THEORY AND TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS
4.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to present a theoretical framework for contract design,
which consists of contract theory (incomplete and complete contract theory) and
transaction cost economics (TCE). Contract theory explains both approaches i.e.
complete and incomplete contract approach. Both approaches of contract theory are
defined and analysed within the context of TCE.
It is also important to note that both TCE and contract theory (CT) are characterised
by two major differences with regard to economic contracts. In (CT) a contract is
regarded as an incentive tool for the farmer, while TCE regards it as an adaptation
tool. Despite this difference CT is embraced within TCE, which is part of the new
institutional economics (NIE) (Menard, 2000). In addition TCE together with CT deal
with common transaction cost problems such as: hidden information and hidden
action problems, dynamic agency issues and incomplete contracts (Masten, 1999).
In most literature it is clearly stated that real world contracts are usually characterised
by incompleteness in the sense that there are inevitably some circumstances or
contingencies that are left out of the contract (Williamson, 1975 and 1985; Hart,
1995; Azfar, 2002; and Brynjolfsson, 1993). As Brynjolfsson (1993) put it, this might
be due to the fact that these circumstances are either unforeseen or simply too
expensive to enumerate in sufficient detail. For instance, the level of tangible quality
of a manufactured product, the level of care used in maintaining certain equipment, or
the thought process used in generating a creative insight are all aspects of a contract
that are often too costly if not impossible to include in a contract. Brynjolfsson (1993)
regarded this as a natural consequence of the bounded rationality of the parties.
In this form of contract (incomplete contract) each of the parties has certain rights
under the contract, but its incompleteness means that there are some residual rights
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that are not specified in the contract. When these rights pertain to the use of an asset,
the institution which allocates these residual rights is property ownership. All rights to
the asset not expressly assigned in the contract accrue to the person called the owner
of the asset. There are several problems associated with incomplete contracts as
discussed in the following sections.
4.2 Contract theory and transaction cost economics
TCE considers bounded rationality as the main concept in determining contractual
relationships. Put differently, contractual incompleteness is assumed to be the result
of this behavioural assumption. CT presents a different perspective; it purports that
contract incompleteness is due to non-verifiability by a court of law (Williamson
1996).
Considering that contracts are incomplete and assuming that contracting parties may
use such characteristics to behave opportunistically, contractual relationships should
be the result of a cost-minimisation process. More precisely such a process
corresponds to a trade-off between the parties. On the one hand, there isthe
willingness of the parties to be covered by the contract, especially if investments
specific to the transaction have been made. On the other hand, there is the willingness
of the parties to adapt the transaction to unanticipated changes (ex post
inefficiencies). As a consequence, the contract is considered not only as an incentive
tool inducing efficient investments, but also as a tool to provide ex post flexibility
once the contract has been signed in order to avoid the dissipation of the quasi-rent" in
inefficient ex post bargaining.
TCE represents another approach to studying institutional arrangements. The
emphasis is on governing transactions. TCE holds that all but the simplest transaction
requires some kind of mechanism - what Williamson (1985) referred to as
governance structure to protect the transacting parties from various hazards associated
with exchange, as discussed later in this chapter.
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The appropriate governance structure depends on the characteristics of the
transaction, so TCE implies an applied research programme of comparative
contractual analysis - that is, how do different forms of governance work in various
circumstances? For this reason transaction cost is sometimes described as the
governance branch of the NIE as opposed to the measurement branch, associated with
Alchian and Demsetz (1972).
The governance approach is distinguished by its emphasis on incomplete contracts. In
the transaction cost framework, economic organisation imposes costs due to the fact
that complex contracts are usually incomplete. A complete contract specifies a course
of action, a decision, terms of trade contingent on every possible future state of
affairs.
In the textbook model of competitive general equilibrium all contracts are assumed to
be complete. The future is not known with certainty, but the probability distributions
of all possible future events are known. In an important sense the model is eternal: all
relevant future contingencies are considered in the ex ante contracting stage, so there
are no decisions to be made, no actions to be taken at all, as the future plays itself out
(Williamson, 1985).
TCE relaxes the assumption of complete contracts and holds that all complex
contracts are unavoidably incomplete. In the real world the future holds genuine
surprises and this limits the available contracting options and also different contracts
work for different situations. In simple transactions, such as procuring off-the-shelf
components, uncertainty may be relatively unimportant and spot market contracting
works well.
For more complex transactions, such as the purchase of specialised equipment, a
more sophisticated contract is needed. However, such a contract will typically be
incomplete; it will provide remedies for only some possible future contingencies. This
results in opportunistic behaviour. One example of such contracts is the relational
6 Quasi-rents are payments in excess of the amount necessary to keep an asset in its current use
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contract; an arrangement that describes shared goals and a set of general principles
that govern the relationship. Another is the implicit contract, which is an arrangement
that, while un-stated, is assumed to be understood by all sides. Williamson attributes
contractual incompleteness to cognitive limits or bounded rationality, following
Simon's (1961) interpretation of human action as intendedly rational, but only
limitedly so.
Analysing Contracts: In addition to the above-mentioned theoretical background, it
should be understood that contracts are not analysed in the same way by these
approaches (contract theory and transaction cost theory). While both approaches
emphasise the importance of investments, some notable differences still exist as
shown by Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Main differences between transaction cost theory and incomplete
contract theory
Contract Behavioural Informational Environmental Sources of Contract role
theories assumptions assumptions assumptions contractual
incompleteness
Incomplete Substantive Asymmetric Risk Non- Mainly an
contract rationality information verifiability of incentive tool
theory between relevant to minimise
contracting variables investment
parties and distortions
third parties
Transaction Bounded Asymmetric Uncertainty Mainly bounded Mainly an
cost theory rationality or information rationality adaptation tool
opportunism between all to minimise
parties transaction
costs
Source: (Saussier, 1999)
These differences help one to understand why the contract is not analysed in the same
way in both approaches. Regarding incomplete contract theory, the purpose of the
contract is to minimise ex ante investment distortions that can affect the surplus the
parties have to share ex post. In transaction cost economics and contract theory two
main different perspectives exist: on one hand, the contract is an incentive tool to
prompt the parties to invest (contract theory). On the other hand, it is a tool that must
(Anonymous.2004).
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permit rapid and inexpensive ex post adaptations in order to make gains from trade
(this is the role that is particularly emphasised by transaction cost theory) (Williamson
1996).
Although very little has been done to test incomplete contract theory's propositions
regarding contractual choices, transaction cost theory appears to be an empirical
success story, as argued by Williamson (1996). Transaction cost theory assumes that
economic agents seek to economise on both transaction and production costs,
considering that transaction costs are linked directly to the transaction characteristics.
All the propositions derived from this framework are based on the following
characteristics: asset specificity, uncertainty levels and frequency of the transaction.
When transaction cost theory is followed closely, the choice of contractual form and
the decision to invest in specific assets are made simultaneously (Williamson, 1996).
4.2.1 Bounded Rationality and Uncertainty
The above two concepts explain the reasoning behind contract incompleteness, that is
an incomplete contract due to the presence of bounded rationality and uncertainty. As
pointed out by Simon (1976 and 1987), bounded rationality implies that economic
agents do not know all the solutions to the problems they face, they are unable to
calculate the possible outcomes of these solutions and are unable to arrange these
outcomes perfectly according to their preferences. In other words, although people
intend to make rational decisions, they are unable to do so due to the limited capacity
to evaluate all possible decisions accurately (Hobbs, 1997). This becomes a serious
problem in uncertain situations, where the ability of people to take rational decisions
is constrained.
For contracts this means that economic agents are unable to design optimal solutions
taking into account every relevant contingency without incurring high and sometimes
prohibitive costs and delays. If one assumes that decisions are time consuming and
costly, that agents can make mistakes and that they are victims of strong information
asymmetries because they do not share a common vision of their present and future
economic positioning, then one can understand why a complete contract cannot be
drawn up.
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Another reason explaining contractual incompleteness is radical uncertainty. Agents
cannot imagine the characteristics of the future. With radical uncertainty the agents do
not know the possible characteristics of the future states of the world; they cannot
draw up contingent contracts that will fit every future situation efficiently (Coase,
1998).
4.2.2 Opportunistic behaviour and prisoner's dilemma problems
It is argued that opportunism and prisoner's dilemma are the consequences of
uncertainty and bounded rationality. In transaction cost literature this is known as
"self-interest seeking with guile". Hobbs (1997) argued that it is not always the case
that opportunistic behaviour will prevail, but the risk of opportunism is usually
present, especially when there are a small number of lucrative opportunities or
bargain problems. The example provided by Azfar (2002) of the sugar farmer and the
miller simplifies this concept. Immediately after the miller has invested, the farmer
sees some opportunity to act opportunistically. The farmer decides to hold up sugar
cane in demand for higher prices. This opportunistic behaviour is also made possible
by the fact that the level of asset specificity on the side of the miller makes it very
expensive to dis-invest, and the farmer is aware of that.
Hobbs (1997) has argued that the fewer the number of alternative suppliers available
to a buyer, the more likely it is that an existing supplier will act opportunistically to
alter the terms of the business relationship to his own advantage. Amongst other
things this can be shown by demanding a higher price than that previously agreed
upon.
In further explaining opportunistic behaviour Axelrod (1987) and Forest (1985) used
the prisoner's dilemma problem. According to them, this explanation originated from
political science and game theory. It is described as a classic problem of conflict and
co-operation. It is an abstraction of the situation felt by a prisoner who can either cut a
deal with the prosecutor and thereby rat on his partner in crime (defect) or keep silent
and therefore tell nothing of the misdeed (co-operate).
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This so-called prisoner's dilemma has drawn interest from a number of theorists,
especially game theorists. Each of two partners has a choice of co-operating with the
other or defecting. Depending on the partner's decisions, each receives a pay-off
according to a pay-off matrix as shown in Table 4.2 below.
Table 4.2: Pay-off Matrix on prisoner's dilemma
Player 2
Co-operate Defect
Co-operate R=6, R=6 S=O, T=10
Player 1
Defect T=10,S=O P=2,P=2
Source: Axelrod (1987) & Forest (1985)
According to Table 4.2 when both players (partners) co-operate they are both
rewarded at an equal, intermediate level (reward R). When one player defects, he
receives the highest level of pay-off (temptation, T), while the other player gets the
sucker's just deserts (sucker, S). When both players defect, they both receive an
intermediate penalty (P).
4.2.3 Asset specificity
The extent to which opportunistic behaviour or the risk associated with it exists in a
business relationship usually depends on the level of asset specificity. For instance, a
sugar miller decides to invest in a sugar farm with the idea of eliminating transport
and other related costs. The mill has no alternative use other than milling the farmer's
sugar cane. If the farmer then decides to act opportunistically, the asset invested by
the miller remains unused. It is then better to run at a loss than completely dis-invest.
Figure 4.1 is presented as a supporting tool to further illustrate the concept of asset
specificity. The diagram helps to clarify and understand the influence of asset
specificity in deciding about the type of market and type of arrangement suitable for
the business.
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Cost m (k) x (k) h ( )
k 1
Asset specificity
Figure: 4.1 The level of asset specificity and the cost of governance
Williamson (1985)
kO k2
Where: m (k) = Spot market
x(k) = Hybrid forms
h (k) = Hierarchy
This diagram shows the relationship between the level of asset specificity and the
governance cost prevailing in the relationship. In determining the more efficient
governance structures, according to Williamson (1985), the chosen governance
structure is the one that provides inferior transaction costs or low costs, as determined
by the attributes of the transactions.
The diagram demonstrates that the greater the specificity of assets, the greater the
hierarchy tendency. The spot market entails minor costs when asset specificity is low,
as shown by k 0 to k 1 in Figure 4.1. The graph shows that the cost of governance
increases as asset specificity increases, showing a positive relationship between costs
and asset specificity in the relationship. This is shown by the movement from k 1 to k
2, which is the hierarchy h (k), and appears to be more advantageous.
In summary, it is noticed that the spot market is associated with relatively lower costs
at lower asset specificity than hybrid and hierarchy markets, as illustrated by m (k)
and h (k). As shown by Figure 4.1, the costs of investing in spot markets outweigh the
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benefits of doing so when asset specificity increases. This then means only low levels
of asset specificity are favourable for fresh markets as they are associated with
relatively low costs. Mussel growers face high levels of asset specificity and therefore
fresh markets become unfavourable for them, as they are associated with relatively
high market risks and costs.
4.2.4 Information asymmetry
Information asymmetry is one of the most crucial transaction costs factors in any
business relationship. This is a situation where one party knows more than the other
regarding the transaction or about the item involved in the transaction. The neo-
classical theorists assumed perfect information, whilst transaction cost theory violates
this assumption (Hobbs, 1997).
Transaction cost theory recognises that information is incomplete and therefore
business partners have to use such information to conduct a transaction. As argued by
Hobbs (1997), this can lead to opportunistic behaviour in that, when information is
hidden before transactions take place, adverse selection prevails. In his article on the
market for lemons, Akerlof (1970) in Hobbs (1997) suggested that in a situation of
asymmetric information, a seller may possess information about defects in a product
such as a faulty second-hand car that is not available to the potential buyer. Therefore
the fact that this information was not revealed to the buyer simply represents
opportunistic behaviour. It therefore becomes difficult for a buyer to distinguish
between a good and a bad car. As a result he may pay the same price for both cars.
Moral hazard is also a result of hidden information, and this usually emerges after the
transaction (ex post opportunism). If there are difficulties in observing the actions of
the other party, this can act as an incentive to behave opportunistically to increase
economic welfare. Hobbs (1997) cited the example of an insurance company which is
unable to observe the actions of the client; as a result more clients take less care in
preventing fire and this in turn leads to more fires (fraud) and higher premiums paid.
Some people may even decide to damage items deliberately just to collect more
insurance payments.
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In contrast to opportunistic behaviour, there is steward behaviour, where the word of
the party can be taken as his bond. This is a trust relationship, here the assumption of
opportunistic behaviour is violated
4.2.5 Principal agent problem
The principal agent problem describes interactions between two parties to a contract,
namely an agent and a principal. The legal origin of these terms suggests that the
principal engages the agent to act on his behalf. The agent does not necessarily have
to be an employee of the principal. Usually the agent is the one who is in a position to
gain some advantage by reneging on the agreement. Therefore the principal has to
provide the agent with incentives to abide by the terms of the contract.
In simple terms the principal agent problem is divided into a hidden action problem
and a hidden information problem. In a hidden action problem the agent takes an
action on behalf of the principal, and the principal is not able to observe the action of
the agent completely. Therefore the principal has to provide incentives for the agent to
choose an action that is in the best interest of the principal.
In a hidden information problem the agent possesses some private information that
can be used for decision making by the principal. Therefore in order for the principal
to obtain such information he has to provide incentives for the agent to supply the
information. The principal and the agent should jointly choose a contract that
specifies an action and a division of the revenue that is Pareto efficient. It is argued
, that if all variables were observable and verifiable, the principal and the agent would
presumably choose a contract that ispareto efficient (Anonymous, 2003).
In cases where the agent's action is neither verifiable nor observable, the action
specified by the contract must be consistent with the agent's incentives. A contract is
said to be incentive compatible if it satisfies a given constraint. And it is incentive
efficient if it is incentive compatible and if another incentive compatible contract that
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leads to one party being better off without making the other party worse off (pareto
optimal point) does not exist (Anonymous, 2003).
4.2.6 Trust
Trust is one of the most critical concepts in a business relationship, especially in
contractual relationships, as it avoids or reduces the risk of opportunistic behaviour. It
follows that, due to the existence of trust, steward behaviour, which opposes
opportunistic behaviour, exists. Masuku (2003) referred to trust as the belief that a
party's word or a promise is reliable and that the party will fulfil his obligation in an
exchange relationship. This is one of the important elements that should be considered
when establishing a contractual relationship between small mussel growers and the
firm.
Generally trust is important in most contractual relationships, but this is not always
the case, depending on the nature of the relationship and the business. The importance
of trust is determined by its economic value to a particular relationship. This is a very
broad concept which could be classified in various ways; Masuku (2003) made the
following distinctions:
t. contractual trust: this entails shared norms and promise keeping according to
contractual agreements.
ii. competency trust, which refers to a shared understanding of professional
conduct as well as technical and managerial standards.
iii. good-will trust, which depends on a consensus of fairness.
Chiles and McMackin (1996) in Levi (1998) argued that the conditions that generate
trust can be understood in terms of social norms, and social embeddedness. Trust is
therefore an important issue in supply chain integration, since effective planning
based on shared information between and among partners is an essential element to
make such integration successful. It is therefore argued that trust is the determinant of
commitment. Trust ensures a flow of information from both parties through effective
communication.
This is based on the assumption that, if trust exists, then hidden information and
principal agent problems will be minimised and therefore market information will be
58
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
shared amongst parties (Suh and Kwon, 2003). When parties believe in each other and
are committed, fewer problems exist and are resolved by both parties as agreed (joint
problem solving). This leads to co-operation and therefore co-ordination will be
improved. Efficient transfer of products from the production unit to the (buyer) firm
will result (logistics). When all the above elements are ensured, less cost in acquiring
and digging, and more market information and production information, etc. ensue.
Transaction costs will then be minimised.
Several economists, including Oliver Williamson, have questioned the necessity of
trust in the exchange relationship. According to Williamson (1993) transaction cost
economics maintains that opportunistic agents do not enforce open-ended promises to
behave responsibly, and therefore efficient exchange is realised only if dependencies
are supported by credible commitments. According to him, trust is irrelevant to
commercial exchange and reference to trust in this connection promotes confusion.
To demonstrate trust's role in various forms of exchange, Levi (1998) maintains that
this requires both a clear understanding of the concept and means to observe and
measure its role, implying an empirical theory of trust. According to him, researchers
including Williamson, have actually ignored this concept and hence there is even less
consideration of how to identify it and how to measure it.
Despite this ignorance, the presence of trust reduces the transaction costs of searching,
enforcing and monitoring a contract. How then does one know when there is trust and
at what level it is, despite the work it does? A number of factors such as belief, social
capital and the history of the relationship as shown in the mussel industry (project)
can provide answers to this question. Trust is rare outside of interpersonal relations
and prevails among those with considerable knowledge of each other's incentives. It
is difficult to study trust directly as it involves beliefs; Levi (1998) maintained that it
is possible, but nor always easy, to study trustworthiness.
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4.3 Concluding remarks
This chapter dealt with both transaction cost and contract theory to explain the role
and importance of contracts in dealing with the transaction cost characteristics of the
firm. This chapter further complemented Chapter Three, which showed that
minimising transaction costs is one of the reasons for increased vertical co-ordination.
In addition the chapter provided a sound theoretical and conceptual framework.
/'
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CHAPTER FIVE
Transaction costs as a basis for deciding on contract design for Masiza
Mussel Growers in Saldanha Bay
5.1 Introduction
The theoretical framework for TCE and CT as described and presented in Chapter
Four is applied in this chapter for analysis and interpretations in an attempt to design a
contract for Masiza. This is aimed at reducing TC and risks through co-ordination,
supply chain integration and trust-based relationships between Blue Bay, Masiza and
La Vie within the mussel value chain.
5.2 The Mussel supply Chain for Masiza Mussel Growers
The diagram below shows an overview of the mussel supply chain from Masiza to La
Vie, distributors, wholesalers and retailers. The study analyses a transaction between
Masiza and Blue Bay and one between Masiza and La Vie as identified by the arrows.
These transactions are used as the unit of analysis to decide on the nature of contracts
suitable for the parties (Masiza, La Vie and Blue Bay).
Masiza
(Small -
growers) La Vie Distributors Wholesale Retail
f----+ (Processor) _____. (Cape Town) r-----. _____.
Blue Bay
(Large
f-
grower)
Figure: 5.1 Mussel supply chain for Masiza Mussel Growers
5.3 Motivations for contracting
Blue Bay and La Vie have both demonstrated adequate benefits that allow cost
savings to be conferred on Masiza through contracting e.g. marketing, resource
provision and production contracts as discussed below. Masiza as a new entrant is
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currently facing several challenges, which relate to inaccessibility of markets, inputs,
resources, services, technology, knowledge and information. These are exacerbated
by long distances to markets (Saldanha Bay to Cape Town), perishability of mussels,
lack of communication infrastructure, lack of transport facilities, and lack of technical
know how of the business. The following table presents impact and implications of
TC for Masiza.
Table 5.1: Risks and transaction costs in Masiza Mussel Growers
Risk factors Transaction Aggregate effect on Possible impact on Implied Response
cost category mussel supply mussel supply chain
chain
· Red-tide Uncertainty · 100% sales are lost · The risks factors resulting· Adverse climatic conditions, due to red-tide for a in uncertainties areenvironmental factors and specific period constraining the supply
pollutants (week) chain relationship. Hence,
· Market risks, production risks · Bad weather growers are encouraged toand credit risks conditions reduce vertically integrate or
· Risk of technical failure of daily productivity contract to guard againstinvestments · Market/production uncertainties and risks. i.euncertainties and Market specification and
risks make it difficult Production management
for small farmers to contracts are encouraged.
plan for the future
· Illiteracy levels Information · Illiteracy and lack of · Market specification· Price differences between asymmetry telecommunication contract will help Masizafresh and frozen market infrastructure result with telecommunication
· Slow flow of market in: - infrastructure. marketinginformation · Misunderstandings skills. & interpretations of· Slow technology transfer · Lack of market information.· Credit availability to Masiza information and · Educating growers to· Limited management skills of understanding of improve literacy isfarmers consumer needs contained in this contract· Difficulties in · Human capital andunderstanding price entrepreneurial
differences as offered developments
by fresh market and · Need for safety netsthe factory (50%)
difference)· Limited technologytransfer, and
management skills.
· Blue Bay as a single supplier Opportunistic 0 · No negative impact, · Ownership, existingof services/resources behaviour as it appears relationship and trust have
· La Vie as a single processor negligible due to a great influence on thisand buyer existing trust and supply chain.
· Masiza as ex-workers dependency· Harvesting schedule/time Time specificity + · Stringent and prompt · This results in low or no· High perishability of mussels delivery times. inventory hence,· market specificationcontract can avoid quality
deteriorations and other
market risks and ensure a
guaranteed market.
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· High investment and Asset specificity + · No alternative use of . Parties in the supply chainestablishment costs resources use only specialised assets,
· Rafts and equipment · High sunk costs this results in reliance on· Processing factory and · Both farmers and each other. This encouragesequipment processor possess stronger relationships.
· Limited alternative use fixed assets; hence Therefore a marketare highly dependent specification and
on each other. production contracts are
encouraged to reduce risks
of technical failure of
investment and ensure
market availability.
· Production site/area Site specificity + · Saldanha Bay as a . Risk sharing with local· Equipment suppliers nutrient rich area firms through production· Suitable Marine conditions hence providing and management contracts.locational
advantages.
· Good productivity· Economies of scaleconstraint (-), neutral (0); enhancement (+)
5.3.1 Access to markets
Blue Bay and La Vie have so far proven to be instrumental in providing markets for
Masiza. Unlike Masiza these firms (Blue Bay and La Vie) have advantages in market
knowledge and experience, business and technical information, legal expertise, and
economies of scale in production, processing, and transport. In addition, they have the
financial muscle and well established networks necessary for sustaining the existing
relationship between them and Masiza. From Masizas perspective, in the absence of
this supply chain relationship the market is missing in the sense that the transaction
costs of accessing other markets such as the fresh live market on a small scale are
relatively high. These missing markets as recorded by interviewees (Masiza) result in
Masiza having to search for buyers, and therefore spending resources in negotiating or
bargaining in order to ascertain the desire of other firms to buy mussels.
The existing transaction costs are attributed to a number of factors such lack of
transport facilities, telecommunication infrastructure, networks, market and
production information, managerial skills and illiteracy, as demonstrated in Table 5.1
above. This table shows that there is information incompleteness in this supply chain.
This is mainly due to illiteracy, language barriers, lack of communication skills and
market information as revealed by personal interviews and field work. The highest
level of education for Masizas members is between grade 0-4, implying that none of
the members has gone beyond lower primary school. One member of the group
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(Masiza) has never attended school. Illiteracy affects their level of communication
and ability to communicate in other languages i.e English and Afrikaans.
The inability to communicate in either English or Afrikaans is a strong disadvantage
as evidenced during field work. Most of the markets or consumers communicate in
both English and Afrikaans, and this makes it hard for Masiza to relate or connect
with the real world (markets). The language and communication problems (illiteracy)
are critical issues in the mussel supply chain resulting in the researcher serving as an
interpreter. This problem is such that Masiza cannot operate independently without
the help of well-established businesses and other independent bodies as facilitators.
Lack of transport facilities also imposes another constraint to these growers (Masiza).
Masiza cannot afford to purchase necessary transport facilities. This makes it hard for
them to source inputs and transport their out put to markets or processors. Long
distances from Saldanha Bay to Cape Town (200 km) where distributors and other
markets are located make it impossible for Masiza to access these markets i.e fresh
live markets. In addition, Masiza do not have the necessary financial capital that will
enable them to participate in such markets. On the other hand, relatively small
volumes also make it hard for Masiza to participate. Even though some of these
markets can be able to collect the produce from Masiza, but small volumes make this
an expensive exercise.
The collaboration of these growers (Masiza) with Blue Bay and La Vie has helped
with addressing production efficiencies (as discussed in the following sections),
availability of markets, market information, net works, translation and interpretation
of information and exposure to the industry. Hence Masiza are encouraged to
contract.
5.3.2 Managing risks
Risks in this regard are characterised by technical failure of investment, price
fluctuations, lack of information, production risks, environmental conditions, credit
risks, and exchange rate votality. From the mussel growers' perspective (Masiza and
Blue Bay), the incidence of red tide disease, although predictable, can bring farming
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to a complete halt and may result in significant losses in turnover. While this
incidence seldom happens (i.e once in five years) the cost of not guarding against it is
large. According to Pienaar (2004), some farms have previously gone bankrupt due to
this disease. Hence it is suggested that Masiza should take insurance against this.
A rapid deterioration in water quality due to unwanted discharges into the water and
other biological occurrences are major threats to mussel farming. Very high water
energy levels as an environmental risk has the potential of damaging or destroying
farming systems. This occurrence is largely unpredictable and can only be managed
via the construction of robust structures and site positioning. Site positioning is
critical for mussel growth; because mussels feed on nutrients in the water. Therefore
the water or site where mussel farming is located should be nutrient rich.
Marine biologists and Micro biologists usually help out with water testing to
determine the level of nutrients required for growth of mussels. These measures are
also important for new entrants in determining suitable production areas, and ensuring
sufficient nutrients for mussels. So far, Masiza are unable to determine when and how
to go about arranging for these tests. Besides organising the tests, it is also difficult
for them to interpret the water test results as they are usually in English or Afrikaans
and too technical/scientific for them to understand. For example according to Wiggins
(2005) citing Pienaar (2004), there were insufficient nutrients in the water towards the
end of 2004.
This was caused by low up welling resulted from insufficient wind blowing from the
BenguelIa current. Because of constant and regular water testing, this was determined
on time and therefore necessary arrangements were made to ensure sufficient growth
of mussels. Masiza do not have capacity nor necessary knowledge to go about
addressing such issues, hence collaboration between them and Blue Bay remains
essential
As the farms are located in the sea where other boats, fishermen, and most
importantly the oil ships pass through, these impose some threats to this farming
system. Other boats or ships can accidentally hit the rafts and break them, growers
also fear that oil ships can easily spill or leak some oil and easily harm mussels.
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Hence according to Pienaar (2004) and the growers, this requires proactive measures
to minimise these risks as they are neither predictable nor avoidable. Masiza do not
have the insurance facilities to guard against this, hence Blue Bay remains an
important figure.
Table 5.1 illustrated effects which these risks factors have on the existing supply
chain and Masiza. Given the nature of this enterprise as explained by these factors,
Masiza cannot afford to exclusively deal with any of these risks. This is mainly due to
the fact that Masiza do not have capital or resources, skills and proper net works that
will help them address these problems. It is only collaboration with well-established
firms that can help them cope with such risks. Contract arrangements with Blue Bay
and La Vie may help them to overcome or minimise such risks, as suggested by
Carney (1998); Royer (1995); and Delgado (1999) and discussed in section 3.7.
5.3.3 Provision of information and logistical support
Information can be expensive to gather. Table 5.1 shows that information
incompleteness is a constraint in the supply chain. Market, production and technical
information, transport, volumes, financial capital and illiteracy are major problems in
the existing supply chain. Hence a participatory approach, integration and capacity
building are encouraged. Collaborating with Blue Bay and La Vie has the advantage
of spreading information to Masiza because Blue Bay provides technical information
and technical assistance on a regular basis.
In addition, this dissemination of information is also combined with management
advice as well as providing feedback on issues regarding the business. This includes
specialised information such as timing of seeding, seeding techniques, harvesting
time, harvesting techniques, management of product quality, and other market and
technical information. As recorded from the interviews, Masiza acknowledges that
without the support from these firms their business would have followed the same
trend as other projects in the area, which succumbed in the past. This was due to lack
of markets, infrastructure, skills, networks, and financial support.
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5.3.4 Access to credit
Masiza as new entrants currently cannot access credit for establishing and operating
the business, because most financial institutions claim that growers (Masiza) do not
have collateral. In addition, these institutions require some historical figures or trends
showing cash flow of the business and how the business is performing. These growers
have been in operation for less than two years which does not provide sufficient data
to justify continuity and sustainability.
Due to the fact that Masiza are small, with little output, and insufficient capital to
serve as collateral, Blue Bay offered to provide as collateral under a buy back option.
In this case the company (Blue Bay) agreed to sell start-up capital such as rafts and
other equipment to Masiza on credit and asked the bank to finance this transaction.
This is done on behalf of Masiza where Blue Bay provides as a collateral to the bank.
If growers (Masiza) default, Blue Bay will buy back the entire capital with interest
from the bank. This is a special arrangement that these two parties (Masiza and Blue
Bay) have arranged. This, according to Pienaar (2004), is the only way that will help
Masiza to access credit from banks.
It is important to note that Masiza have not received any funding so far, and therefore
still owe Blue Bay start-up capital. ABSA bank has just recently approved Masizas
loan application, stating that they have qualified for a certain amount of loan. This
application was consolidated by the fact that these growers are currently in a good
working relationship with Blue Bay and La Vie. On the other side Masiza have also
tried applying for grants and loans from government. While government has promised
that there is money available for such ventures, the process takes too long due to red
tape and inefficiencies. Masiza is currently financing this capital through monthly
repayments made to Blue Bay. Masiza decided to start paying to reduce the debt and
avoid increasing the interest burden.
5.3.5 Access to insurance facilities
Section 5.3.1 and 5.3.2 presented the risk factors, including environmental risks, that
need to be guarded against. Pienaar (2004) recommended that Masiza should have an
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insurance facility to reduce costs associated with these risks factors and to ensure
stability. In addition Masiza as they stand, do not have sufficient capital to take risks
of not insuring their business.
Despite the importance of this facility, the costs associated with it cannot be ignored
because of its inaccessibility to Masiza and high monthly premiums. Blue Bay agreed
to cater for them within the company's insurance facility, subject to a monthly
premium payable to the company. Table 5.2 shows the amount contributed by each
party to the insurance facility per year.
Table 5.2: Insurance facility
Name of the firm Amount due in Rands/year Amount due in percentage/year
Blue Bay Aqua Farm (BBAF) R 62 800 89.72%
Masiza Mussel Growers (MMG) R 7 200 10.28%
Total R 70 000 100%
Own calculations as adapted from Pienaar (2004)
This insurance is required to cover cases such as accidents, pollutants, environmental
damage, etc. (For instance, if a ship or boat hits the rafts and destroys the produce, or
for some reason Masiza are found liable for damaging fishermen's boats etc.
According to Blue Bay the annual insurance fee is about R 70 000, and Masiza are
expected to pay about 10.28 % of this (R7200/year) as shown in Table 5.2 above.
According to the agreement, this insurance fee will be deducted monthly (R
600/month) throughout the year to ensure insurance cover. This also forms part of the
production management contract to be entered into by Blue Bay and Masiza.
5.3.6 Provision of subsidies
Mussel prices depend entirely on external forces such as exchange rates and other
market forces (Visser, 2004). A stronger Rand has made it easier for local consumers
and retailers to purchase overseas produce at the expense of local produce. This
suppressed local mussel prices, particularly for processed and frozen mussel, by
approximately 30% towards between 2003 and 2004.
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This strong price competition also has a greater impact on local producer' prices, such
as Masiza. These growers currently sell fresh live mussels to La Vie at R 3, 25/kg,
and the recent exchange rate has also indirectly put pressure on this price. This results
from the fact that, if prices for locally processed and frozen mussels are suppressed
this also forces local processors to buy fresh live mussel at reduced prices.
According to the processor, if the exchange rate continues to drag down the price,
they will be forced to adjust the entire pricing system, even if it means reducing
Masiza' price. Therefore, government subsidies are necessary to take care of such
cases and to ensure continuity and sustainability of small farmers such as Masiza.
According to Pienaar (2004) and Visser (2004), the subsidy required would ensure
that growers do not sell below production costs, which might be the case if the current
stronger Rand continues.
5.3.7 Capacity building
Table 5.1 shows that there is a high level of information incompleteness that result
from a high level of illiteracy. It is therefore agreed amongst members that training
and workshop programs on language skills, communication skills, presentation skills,
leadership and management skills, and business skills should be organised for the
benefit of these farmers. This capacity building inter alia aims at developing these
growers as future entrepreneurs through mentorship, specialised courses and
experiential learning.
5.3.8 Specialisedassets
The more specific the transaction is, the greater the need for co-ordination,
commitment and reliable exchange. Because this venture involves a high degree of
asset specificity as shown in Table 5.1 as shown in Figure 4.1, spot and fresh markets
cannot fulfil the needs and demands of Masiza. Specialised assets are relatively high
for both Masiza and La Vie due to the huge capital outlay invested in mussel farming
such as rafts, sorting tables, mussel cat, other production equipment, refrigerators,
storage systems, steaming facilities etc. Once invested, their use can hardly be altered
to any other farming system. This factor plays a vital role in the growers' decision-
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making process as also influenced by relatively high sunk costs'. This implies that
Masiza, Blue Bay and La Vie do not have any alternative other than producing or
processing mussels. Hence, there is a high level of dependency on each other and this
enhances the relationship between contracting parties as shown in Table 5.1 and
discussed in section 4.2.3.
5.3.9 Product characteristics
Characteristics of the product also playa major role in deciding whether to contract or
not. As noted in the fieldwork the mussel product is characterised by a number of
features such as:
i. Perishability: mussels are highly perishable, and therefore require immediate
processing. After harvesting the product can be stored for a maximum of three
days, this is only so if it is stored under proper cold storage or refrigerators.
Perishability therefore necessitates growers to secure stable markets to avoid
perishability problems of the mussels. Hence a contract between Masiza and
La Vie is encouraged.
11. Processing: if not processed the mussel can be sold directly to the fresh live
market, but unfortunately Masiza have not been able to access this market.
This is mainly due to relatively high costs of accessing this market such as:
lack of transport, infrastructure, communication facilities, networks,
information and market power. Selling to the local processing factory is the
only viable option for these growers.
111. Permanence: mussel farming is also characterised by asset specificity, which
cannot be altered to other use. This alone results in dependence and reliance
on stable markets for the produce.
IV. Demand: according to Visser (2004) the level of demand for mussels also
plays a vital role. Mussel farming in South Africa is still a developing market
and therefore its demand increases continuously, which is a positive factor to
the venture as highlighted in chapter two.
These features make it difficult for Masiza to rely on fresh live markets for sales and
therefore they require a stable market.
7 Sunk cost: when what is done cannot be undone, implying that there are some costs that cannot be
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5.3.10 Prices and profit margins
The current agreed price is R 3,2S/kg and therefore Masiza offer their produce to La
Vie at this price. On the other hand fresh live markets offer highly competitive prices,
starting from R 6.S0/kg to RIl. SO/kg depending on the size and quality of the
mussel. Masiza always wants to maximise returns from sales. Equation 1 below
shows how the revenue is calculated using the model of Deshayes (1988) cited by
Duvaleix et al. (2003). This model presents production costs, management costs, total
revenue and profit margins.
(1)
where:
R, =Refers to a revenue from sales; S = Sales of the product; Cp = Production costs;
Cm = Management casts; R = reserves.
Management costs are subtracted from Masiza's returns by Blue Bay, who usually
provides these services to Masiza on a daily basis. Some of the generated returns or
profits are usually kept apart as savings for future contingencies, which equation 1
refers to as reserves. The results from equations 1 are presented in Table S.3 below.
This serves to present a brief indication of income and costing of Masiza and the
financial implications of contracting with La Vie and Blue Bay. This refers to
seasonal costs and returns, which is twice a year.
Table 5.3: Seasonal revenue from sales
No of rafts Ropes Marketable Output/raft Income/raft Cost /raft/ó Running Profits
(ó) produce (Kg)/óm' (Rs)/óm m costs/Raft (R)/óm
(Kg/rope) lO/Óm
Per raft 400 50 20000 R70400 RIO 320 R 5 332 R 54 748
Per Órafts 2400 3000 120000 R 422 400 R 61920 R 31 992 R 328 488
.Own calculations as adapted from Pienaar (2004)
reversed.
8 6m = 6 months (this is an average production period for mussels to mature)
9 This refers to the monthly instalment for repaying the rafts & equipment @12% rate.
10 Running costs are covered by the R 0,43c/kg payable to BlueBay by Masiza. R O,43c covers:
Provision of transport to production units,
Daily supervision and monitoring
Handling of mussels and technical support including training
Crates, stationary and overhead costs
This R O,43c amounts to R 8, 60/crate (20kg) and R 5332/raft/6m.
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Only R 3.25/kg was considered for calculations, as it is the current selling price for
Masiza. It is therefore clear that Masiza receives a relatively small margin when
selling to La Vie rather than to the fresh live or spot market as shown by price
differences (R 3.25/kg and R 6.50/kg). But the price risks and market uncertainties
associated with the fresh live market should also be borne in mind. This therefore
necessitates Masiza to draw up a contract to safeguard against market uncertainties
and risks and therefore minimise these TC. This is also justified by TCE as it says that
firms vertically integrate only when costs associated with that are less than costs
associated with spot markets, as discussed in section 5.3.1.
5.4 Concluding remarks
This chapter focused on demonstrating the Tes facing Masiza, TC effects and the
implications on the existing relationship. It further showed areas that require attention
when designing the contract to ensure low TC and a viable contract. The results
suggest that TC characteristics of the mussel supply processing operations influence
the choice of governance structure. Hence as stated in TCE, the governance structure
with less transaction costs is chosen.
The results show that the nature of production and processing operations require high
levels of managed co-ordination to ensure quality and stability in the mussel value
chain. The results further suggest that Masiza are better off with contractual
arrangements than relying on spot or fresh-live markets, despite relatively low profit
margins associated with this governance structure.
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CHAPTER SIX
CONTRACT DESIGN FOR MASIZA MUSSEL GROWERS IN SALDANHA
BAY
6.1 Introduction
It may be assumed that La Vie, Blue Bay and Masiza endeavour to act rationally, but
cognitive limitations inhibit them from foreseeing the future. For this reason it
becomes difficult to attain a complete contract arrangement for the parties, as
postulated in both TC literature and CT in chapters three and four.
Blue Bay and La Vie presented their ideas and experiences regarding the contract. On
the other hand, Masiza also expressed themselves through active participation in
several discussions and meetings. A participatory approach was exercised to ensure a
free flow of ideas, experiences, feelings, beliefs and expectations from all three
parties. In addition, the researcher was afforded an opportunity to access all the
necessary documents such as financial budgets, production planning, business plans,
codes of conduct and drafted contracts. This consolidated the information and data
gathering process and thereafter a TC and CT approach was used both for analysis
and interpretation as discussed in section 1.7.
This participatory approach prevented the researcher from being subjective and from
thinking for these parties rather than thinking with them. It helped all parties to
participate actively, think and plan together in a collective manner to promote the
project and result in a viable contract for all parties.
6.2 Selected contracts for Masiza Mussel Growers
After detailed verification and analysis presented in the previous chapter, three basic
contracts were proposed: market specification, resource provision and production
management contracts. This design was done together with Masiza and Blue Bay as
the technical partner, as well as La Vie as the major buyer.
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Due to the fact that Masiza are new entrants and still operating on a small scale with
insufficient capital, therefore it becomes difficult for them to take all the risks. Hence,
they prefer contracting with an established partner and a recognised processor. In
addition, they prefer that the necessary support and coaching should come from
people they know and trust, hence the following contracts were designed.
6.2.1 The Market Specification Contract (MSC) for Masiza Mussel Growers
This section further elaborates and provides more specific explanations on the
suggested specifications in the proposed contracts listed on Tables 6.1 and 6.2 below.
MSC refers to the contract between Masiza and La Vie. This contract aims at
reducing market risks and uncertainties associated with fresh live markets as shown in
Table 5.1. In this instance, La Vie guarantees Masiza that it will purchase their
produce on specified dates as agreed in this contract. The contract can be
implemented for a period of five years, with constant monthly standing meetings. This
five-year period will allow Masiza to fully establish themselves.
Table 6.1 and 6.2 list a summary of all items that feature in the contracts detailed in
these sections (6.2.1, 6.2.2, 6.2.3 and 6.3). These contract specifications as listed
below were obtained from interviews with Masiza, Blue Bay as well as La Vie and
they were then interpreted using both TC and ICT.
Table: 6.1 Description of resource & production contracts and their influence
on transaction costs
Risks factors Proposed contract Contract specifications Impact on
types transaction costs
Technical failure of Resource Provision · Access to equipment and This aspect ensures full
investment, resources, transfer of property
High investment and · Buy back option, rights to growers. This
establishment costs, · Bulk purchase of enhances productivity
Limited managerial skills, resources and equipment, and assures certainty.
Credit profile · Debt amortization Improves growers
schedule, bargaining power and
· Enforcement measures, production stability.· Access to transport and
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Adverse climatic
Production
Management information, production risks and
Production risks,
Environmental risks,
conditions,
Credit inaccessibility,
Slow technology transfer,
Red tide risk, and
Lack of production
management skills
logistical support.
environmental effects,
• Access to production These reduce
• Provision of technical uncertainties,
support,
• Provision of inspection production information
services, both minor and incompleteness,
major checks, maintain quality, and
• Ensuring application of ensure compliance with
good agricultural production
practices (GAP), requirements and other
• Ensuring quality and industry requirements.
productionacceptable
requirements,
• Ensuring compliance with
the existing requirements
• Enforcement measures.
Table 6.2 Description of market specification contract and its influence on
transaction costs
Risks factors Contract types Contract aspects Impact on
transaction costs
Market risks, Market Specifications · Contract duration, These reduce market
Votality of prices, · Quality of the mussel, uncertainties, market
Slow flow of market · Quality of services, risks, market
information, · Price formulas, opportunism, transport
Lack of negotiation · Quantity sold, costs, information
skills · Delivery schedule, incompleteness andHigh perishability of · Payment methods, therefore equip growersmussels
Access market
with necessary· to
information and
experience
networking,
· Enforcement measures.
It is important to note that market risks and uncertainties are transferred to La Vie
together with the decision of when and how to market the product. Masiza do not
have full control over marketing; this rests with La Vie. Despite this agreement
Masiza are free to market their products anywhere as long as the agreed quota is
satisfied. The MSC entails a full description of prices, payment method, product
quality, and times of delivery and payment as discussed below.
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Product characteristics: One important point which also drives Masiza into a contract
arrangement is the shelf life of mussels. Mussels have a relatively short shelf life
ranging from 1-2 days. This calls for immediate consumption or processing, and
hence Masiza are encouraged to secure a stable and guaranteed market.
Delivery terms: Delivery or collection of mussel takes place from Monday to Friday,
immediately after harvesting. According to the parties the usual time is between
11hOOand 13hOOin the morning. They prefer delivery in the morning to avoid direct
heat from the sun, which could result in mussels drying-up and therefore poorer
quality. Masiza deliver mussels in bulk at the harbour. It is important to note that
delivery times are not flexible due to the sensitivity and perishability of mussels.
Another key feature of a mussel contract arrangement is the organisation of inputs and
output distribution and the strict scheduling of transport as influenced by time
specificity. This is a vital aspect of the contract because logistical problems can
jeopardize both Masizas and La Vie's profitability and their existing relationship. It
is important to note that La Vie provides transport to collect mussels from the
harbour, but it is the responsibility of Masiza to ensure that mussels reach the harbour
on time. Poor logistical support will inevitably sour relations with La Vie and reduce
the viability of the venture, hence Blue Bay and La Vie usually ensure that logistical
support is available.
Costs of delivery from the point of production to the harbour is for Masiza's account.
Masiza pay Blue Bay all transport costs for transporting the produce from their
production units to the harbour. This forms part of the R 0, 43c/kg service levy which
Blue Bay deducts monthly from all the produce sold by Masiza for all the services
rendered by Blue Bay to Masiza. The delivery period is in accordance with harvesting
time and requires produce to be collected immediately to avoid quality deterioration.
Quantity delivered: An amount of 20 bins (400 kg/8 ropes/day) of mussels is
delivered to La Vie from Monday to Friday for a period of six months (first half of the
year). After this period all parties may reconsider increasing the amount, depending
on production performance and market opportunities. Masiza acknowledge that,
whereas La Vie require delivery of mussels, they both have complete discretion as to
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when the delivery should be made and as to how much mussels are required at any
particular time. Under no circumstances, other than the above mentioned would
these delivery terms and conditions be altered without full participation and
satisfaction of all the parties.
Price: The price of the mussels also depends on the market forces of supply and
demand. The current price as in 2004/2005 is R 3, 25/kg. All three parties determine
the price based on market forces. Important factors affecting prices are quality, level
of demand, exchange rate, and supply (Visser, 2004). When the Rand is stronger, the
import parity price goes down and suppresses the local produce in favour of imported
produce, suppressing local prices.
Despite these forces, Masizas farm gate price for mussels has not changed for the
entire season. This is mainly influenced by the fact that Masiza have so far proven to
be highly competitive in terms of quality (Visser, 2004). Blue Bay and La Vie have
indicated that Masiza produces far better quality mussels than themselves.
It is important to note that Masiza currently lacks bargaining power with regard to
price determination. Only Blue Bay and La Vie have powers to decide when and how
prices should be adjusted. Therefore, an independent facilitator should be granted
some powers by the parties to become part of such negotiations. Amongst other things
this body will ensure and enforce transparency during these negotiations. The
independent facilitator will also ensure that, Masiza have adequate knowledge about
prices paid to Blue Bay and other producers. Therefore Masiza together with the
facilitator will be part of all monthly standing meetings and participate in any
discussions or improvements that need to be made. To counter act the language
problem, this individual should be at least able to speak Xhosa and any of the official
languages in the Western Cape (English, and Afrikaans)
Payment terms and conditions: The parties agreed that payment will be made at the
end of every month. La Vie will deposit the cheque into Masiza's bank account on
the last day of the month. The deposit slip will be faxed to both Blue Bay and Masiza
for their records as proof of deposit. The original slip will then be forwarded either by
post or personal delivery within four working days. Blue Bay will then deduct all the
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money owed as invoiced from Masiza' account. This withdrawal will be done by both
Blue Bay and one member from Masiza against both their signatures. These deposit
slips, receipts and invoices will be presented in all monthly meetings.
A number of accompanying documents are essential. A daily invoice book for daily
sales, daily invoice books for costs and fee charges (for services rendered by Blue
Bay). Masiza also are required to present their monthly bank statement showing all
monthly withdrawals and debits (amount owed to) to Blue Bay and to at least one
independent third party at performance meetings, which will be arranged monthly.
Product quality: According to Visser (2004), the processing company (La Vie)
requires the same quality from Masiza as is expected from Blue Bay. A minimum
width of 4 cm and height of 6 cm for black mussels are minimum market
requirements. Cleaning takes place on the rafts as suggested by parties. This saves
time and makes work easier and therefore contributes to productivity. According to
the growers, they are able to harvest and seed at the same time, which saves them
time.
Masiza have so far managed to meet market standards in terms of quality and most
importantly Visser (2004) indicated that the quality of mussels from Masiza is better
compared to Blue Bay's mussels. He further pointed out that despite the minimum
quantities these growers are making, there is a significant value adding that the entire
industry has realised. The quality that Masiza is producing is referred to as top class
quality and therefore the industry endeavours to ensure that they continue producing
it. What makes Masizas mussels better is the fact that they employ manual labour
unlike using machinery which sometimes breaks the product resulting in crakes etc.
6.2.2 Resource Providing Contract (RPC) for Masiza Mussel Growers
This is the contract entered into by Masiza and Blue Bay. Blue Bay has provided the
following equipment to Masiza on loan and therefore repayment is required: (a)
seeding table, (b) sorting table, (c) board, (d) binding/cotton net, (e) gloves and
sleeves, (f) boots, (g) rain suits, (h) polo neck/sweaters, (i) manufactured ropes, G)
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water, (k) boats, (I) information (m) technology, (n) knife, (0) technical advice and (p)
rafts.
These items were provided on credit by Blue Bay at the beginning of the project.
Therefore Masiza are required to repay the loan in monthly instalments with interest.
In financing these resources a special arrangement was made. Blue Bay agreed to
stand surety on behalf of Masiza and ensure that the bank does not repossess the rafts,
(see section 5.3.4). The aim is to buy the rafts back and re-employ the farmers in the
case of them defaulting and as a last resort measure. Blue Bay and Masiza
collectively buy other production equipment e.g gloves, knives, cotton nets and boots
from suppliers in bulk volumes. This gives them an opportunity to share costs and
therefore eliminates unnecessary costs which are usually incurred in the case of a
single buyer.
In addition buying in bulk usually offer relatively higher bargaining powers to bargain
for lower prices. This also gives Masiza an opportunity to share transport costs and
others. Blue Bay purchases all the required items and thereafter debits Masiza's bank
account with the amount owed. An invoice showing the total amount paid for the
items is provided to Masiza immediately after purchase or during monthly
performance meetings. The amount owed by Masiza for the items is calculated by
both Blue Bay and Masiza.
In addition Blue Bay has agreed to render the following services, for an amount of
RO, 43clkg. They will maintain the rafts and equipment in a satisfactory condition.
These rafts or equipment are bench marked against Blue Bay's rafts, hence their
standard should meet that of Blue Bay and as required by the market. An invoice for
maintenance and repairs is required at all times. Blue Bay will further ensure that the
rafts are properly stocked at all times. This is done through daily supervision by both
Masiza and Blue Bay.
Blue Bay carries out monthly inspections of the rafts as part of the RO,43c/kg charge.
In addition there is one major check which is done once a year through Cape Diving
at R lS0/hour for cleaning rafts and ropes, and for carrying out minor and major sub-
surface repairs on the rafts. Blue Bay arranges daily visits to the rafts, monitors
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working methods, exchanges ideas, co-ordinates work flow, provides weather
forecasts and assists Masiza with record keeping.
The provision of material inputs to Masiza is an important feature of this contract.
Before each production cycle Masiza prepares a list of required equipment based on
scheduled production. Blue Bay will then assess the necessity of such equipment and
therefore continue with the transactions. Large and expensive materials such as
seeding tables, ropes etc are usually on Blue Bay's account, which are later deducted
from Masiza' s proceeds on a monthly basis.
This contractual arrangement also resulted in a transfer of technology from Blue Bay
to Masiza. Blue Bay is willing to provide all required technology to Masiza to ensure
quality and efficiency. Since Blue Bay and La Vie both have higher bargaining
powers than Masiza a third party is required as previously discussed in section 6.2.1
above and further substantiated in section 6.3 below.
The incentives that Blue Bay is getting for their services go beyond the R O,43c/kg
charged to Masiza. The government has also created a favourable economic
environment for companies involved in empowerment. These incentives include tax
rebates or reduction in company taxes. Therefore besides the willingness shown by
Blue Bay, there are also some incentives received which encourage a participation of
this nature.
This contract is designed mainly to ensure full participation of Masiza in all aspects of
the business.
6.2.3 Production Management Contract (PMC) for Masiza Mussel Growers
This is a contract entered into by Masiza and Blue Bay. While Masiza are given six
rafts and other production equipment, they do not have complete control over
production. Technical support and management skills are rendered by Blue Bay to
Masiza from time to time as required. Blue Bay renders some additional training
services to equip Masiza with the specific skills necessary for mussel farming. In
addition, other forms of training also entail developing maritime skills (driving boats
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and operating the mussel cat, etc). This also forms part of equipping them to become
independent mussel growers in the future.
As outlined above under the PMC, Masiza do not have complete discretion regarding
how many ropes should be seeded, and how much should be harvested. The daily
seeding and harvesting depends on production forecasting and calculations for the
seasons. The aim is to ensure continuous and sustainable production with a constant
flow of income.
Blue Bay intervenes in production mostly for quality assurance reasons and good
production practices. This ensures that good quality is produced and therefore
guarantees a market with a reasonable price. Market and price risks are transferred
from Masiza to Blue Bay in this contract, similar to the market specification contract.
The firm takes a substantial part of managerial responsibility on behalf of Masiza to
ensure smooth operation and good quality products. This contract together with the
resource management contract is thus interlinked.
6.3 Contract enforcement
This section presents different enforcement mechanisms suitable to the various
parties.
6.3.1 Market Specification Contract
If Masiza fail to fulfil their duties in terms of this contract, La Vie will convene an
immediate meeting with Masiza to address the problem. Masiza will nominate an
independent third party should they see a need to do so. The meeting shall consist of
Masiza, La Vie and Blue Bay, and an independent third party.
In such meetings La Vie will grant Masiza 30 days to remedy the situation. Should
Masiza remain in breach, La Vie can give up all rights in terms of the contract.
Thereafter Blue Bay, Masiza and the independent third party will deliberate on the
matter and explore the remaining options. The last option will be re-employing
Masiza as farm labourers. This will only happen after all the other avenues are
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explored such as ensuring that proper support is available, capacity building, and
availability of resources as mentioned in the contract.
On the other hand, if La Vie is in breach similar steps will be followed and Masiza,
and La Vie, together with the third party, will decide on appropriate penalties. Masiza
can in this case use the buy-back option as an enforcement tool. This option, as
discussed previously, states that, should Masiza go bankrupt or fail, Blue Bay will
take responsibility for such failure. This is an expensive exercise for Blue Bay, hence
it is in their interest to ensure that Masiza do not go bankrupt.
It is also important to highlight that Blue Bay has shares in the processing factory.
Therefore if Masiza decides to withhold supply, the entire industry will lose about
10% of the total output resulting in relatively less profits. This implies that if Masiza
fails, all three parties will be affected. It should also be born in mind that this 10%
contribution from Masiza carries some weight because of their relatively high quality.
On the other hand, Masiza can decide to shirk or act opportunistically. This would
result in Masiza supplying relatively fewer mussels and selling the rest to rival
alternative buyers. This will be a manifestation of a prisonerdilemma. La Vie has
also expanded the factory and their operations to cater for additional supply from
Masiza. This expansion has some cost implications for the factory, hence La Vie
cannot afford anything less than what Masiza currently supplies.
In addition to the buy back option, the Masizas project has gained significant
publicity. This is justified by the fact that this project formed part of the Provincial
launch of Mariculture and Aquaculture projects in March 2003 in the Western Cape.
This project was presented in front of the former provincial Minister of Social
Development in 2003 and other high profile politicians in the Western Cape. The
media, also academics and a masters' student have written and published a number of
articles on this project.
All three parties are aware of these facts, and therefore it is expected that the two
parties Blue Bay and La Vie will not drag themselves into bad publicity, as will be the
case if Masiza fails. Image is one of the essential factors that make a business succeed
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and remain competitive. Therefore as a business, Blue Bay and La Vie endeavour to
protect their image to maintain standards and remain competitive. This also counts in
favour of Masiza in that all three parties are at least expected to cooperate to avoid
unnecessary costs that are associated with bad publicity, shirking and opportunism.
6.3.2 Resource Providing and Production Management Contract
Masiza and Blue Bay enter into both RPC and PMC. In this case Blue Bay convenes a
meeting with Masiza or Masiza convenes a meeting with Blue Bay depending on
which party is in breach. It is mandatory for both parties to ask an independent third
party to attend. If both parties decide to convene a meeting without the presence of the
third party, that meeting would not grant them any decision-making powers.
In this meeting 30 days notice is given to the party in breach of contract to remedy the
situation. In the event of failure to comply or to remedy the situation within 30 days,
and only when there are no alternatives to improve the situation will Blue Bay be
allowed to buy back the rafts and equipment from the bank and absorb Masiza as
employees.
In the case of Blue Bay failing to comply within the given period (30 days), Masiza
will convene a meeting with an independent third party and deliberate on the matter.
After this, a final decision whether to extend the notice or terminate the contract with
the condition of re-employing Masiza members will be taken. The contract may be
terminated by any of the parties if one party proves not to take the necessary actions
to correct such failure within a stated period. It is important to note that no party will
be able to terminate nor take decisions regarding contract terms with out full
participation of all parties concerned and a third independent party.
6.4 Concluding the research questions
This section concludes the entire study by responding to the research questions
documented in Chapter one. The central question of the study is stated as follows:
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6.4.1 What are the necessary elements of a viable contract that ensure resource
provision, production management activities and market specifications at lower
transaction costs for Masiza Mussel Growers?
A detailed response to the above central question is documented in sections 6.2 and
6.3 above, which is composed of three designed contracts and appropriate
enforcement mechanisms. Following this question are two sub-questions.
6.4.1.1 What are the transaction cost factors facing Masiza Mussel Growers that
impede them from participating in contractual arrangements within the
industry?
Masiza suffer costs of accessing markets, accessing production credit and production
resources, cost of searching for markets and production information, environmental
risks associated with production, market uncertainty and market risks associated with
fresh live markets, and lack of managerial skills requiring continuous supervision.
These relatively high transaction costs prevail in different phases of the project and
are characterised as, pre-production transaction costs, production transaction costs,
processing and marketing transaction costs, as well as the economic and political
environment (see table 5.1).
Masiza also find it difficult to access mussel seed for seeding rafts and Blue Bay can
mainly provide this. Lack of transport facilities to get to the rafts, for delivery and
collection of mussels and seeds exacerbate the situation. Therefore working with Blue
Bay and La Vie will eliminate most of their problems and minimise production,
environmental and market risks.
Masiza find it difficult to operate independently without support from Blue Bay and
La Vie. In this instance a contractual arrangement between Masiza, La Vie and Blue
Bay is necessary. Hence three contracts are designed to address transaction costs
problems as previously discussed in Chapter five, and section 6.2 and 6.3 above.
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6.4.1.2What is the nature of the relationship that is necessary to improve co-
ordination and enhance contractual arrangements between Masiza
Mussel Growers and the processor that addresses opportunism,
information incompleteness, uncertainty and contract incompleteness?
It is generally agreed that for these contracts to work, trust is essential. Therefore in
concluding this study a trust-based relationship is highlighted as one of the critical
components of this contractual relationship. Following the theoretical principles of
CT and TCE, it is argued that all contracts are incomplete, implying that not all future
contingencies are safeguarded. TCE together with CT state that this usually serves as
a basic premise for economic agents to act opportunistically. Hence Masiza, Blue Bay
and La Vie emphasise trust in the entire supply chain. They try to ensure that trust is
maintained through open communication at all levels, monthly meetings, fulfilling
obligations and clarifying all relevant issues at all times.
The existing relationship between Masiza and La Vie is also characterised by
relatively high levels of asset specificity for both parties. This is one of the factors
which makes Masiza together with La Vie put more emphasis on a trust based
relationship. This is also due to the fact that the level of dependency is high resulting
from high asset specificity. One can therefore conclude that trust in this instance
carries some economic value, as it's absence would lead to poorer co-ordination and
inefficiencies in the supply chain.
The other bargaining tool for Masiza is their acknowledged good quality. This high
quality also provides them with some leverage and bargaining power. This according
to Visser (2004) puts the local industry at an advantage over imported mussels.
Consumers are becoming more educated and well informed about the product hence
are able to differentiate good quality from poor quality. Therefore Masiza have so far
contributed positively to the entire industry and therefore received high recognition
both from the industry and public.
On the other hand it cannot be assumed that Blue Bay and La Vie will remain
trustworthy forever, and provisions for such cases are necessary. The contract has also
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emphasised the participation of an independent third party. This refers to a public
body either from the government or other public institutions. This body's main role is
to represent Masizas interest at all levels, to ensure transparency in terms of the
pricing system, quality determination, and other issues. In addition, this individual
should also provide some extension services on regular bases.
On the other hand, this supply chain relationship is also characterised by the so-called
buy back option as discussed in chapter five above. It is therefore in the interest of all
three parties, particularly Blue Bay, to ensure that Masiza does not default. Failure by
Masiza implies that Blue Bay will cover all relevant production costs. Therefore in
enforcing this contract Blue Bay will play a considerable role as it is also in their
interest to ensure that the project succeeds as discussed in section 6.3.1.
6.5 Concluding remarks
In response to research questions in chapter one and TC and risks factors raised in
Chapter Five, the contracts between Masiza and Blue Bay together with a contract for
Masiza and La Vie were designed. Three contracts were found necessary for this
venture i.e, a market specification, a resource provision, and a production
management contract.
This contractual arrangement gives Masiza an opportunity to develop and grow in the
business and become future independent entrepreneurs. It enables them to operate
under conducive environments such as: access to markets; provision of material
inputs and information; capacity building; technical support and better access to
credit. The later is also made evident by the fact that ABSA bank recently approved a
loan facility for Masiza. Therefore these contracts further ensure adequate
participation of Masiza within the industry.
In concluding the contract enforcement aspect, five essential factors were identified.
These include; (i) profile of the project (Masiza) as discussed in section 6.3.1; (ii) buy
back option as discussed in section 5.3.4; (iii) independent third party as presented in
section 6.2.1; (iv) good will trust; and (v) quality of mussels as discussed in section
6.2.1. These are the main factors that can work to Masizas advantage with regard to
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ensuring that all three parties operate smoothly and within the terms and conditions of
this contract.
In conclusion, the results of this study suggest that this contract has served as an
institution that allows Masiza to overcome barriers of entry to the mussel industry and
other financial institutions such as ABSA bank. This therefore enables Masiza to
become independent entrepreneurs. This study also showed that Masiza would not
have overcome these barriers of entry to the industry and to the financial sector
without the assistance of Blue Bay and La Vie. Therefore a contract that ensures
adequate incentives for all parties in the existing supply chain to promote and
preserve a trust-based relationship is required.
87
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
REFERENCES
AKERLOF, G.A. (1970). The market for lemons: qualitative uncertainty and the
market mechanism. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 84:488-500.
ALCHIAN, A.A, AND DEMSETZ, H. (1972). Production, information costs, and
economic organisation, American Economic Review, 62(5): 777-795.
AL-NAJJAR, N. (1995). Incomplete contracts and governance of complex contractual
relationships, American Economic review. 85: 432-435.
ANONYMOUS. (2003). The principal agent
www.econ.nyu.edu/user/galed/chap01.pdf. accessed 28/07/03.
problem.
ANONYMOUS. (2004). Vertical integration, appropriable rents, and the competitive
contracting process.
www.uchicago.edu/fac/thomas.hubbard/research/ec174/IecturesI13kca.htm
AXELROD, R. (1987). The evolution of strategies in the iterated prisoner's dilemma:
The Iterated Prisoners Dilemma Problem. www.brunel.ac.uk/research/AIIalife/ga-
axelr.htm accessed 07/08/03.
AZFAR, O. (2002). The New Institutional Economics Approach to Economic
Development: An Analytic Primer. IRIS Center University of Maryland. Washington,
D.C.
BAUMANN, P. (2000). Equity and efficiency in contract farming schemes: The
experience of Agricultural tree crops. Overseas Development Institute. Working
Paper. 111 Westminster Bridge Road. London. UK.
BINSWANGER, H.P. AND ROSENSWEIG, M.R. (1986). Behavioural and material
determinants of production relations in agriculture. The Journal of Development
Studies, 22: 505-531.
BOL, I. (2002). Netherlands, the cradle for bottom mussel farming. First
international mussel forum-country presentation. AC02 Abstracts. Yerseke.
Netherlands.
BRINK, D. (2001). Aquaculture production 10 South Africa. Paper presented at
AFMA's symposium, 12 October.
BRYNILFSSON, B.E. (1993). An incomplete contracts theory of information,
technology and organization. Center for coordination science. Cambridge,
Massachusetts.
CARNEY, I.A. (1998). Struggles over crop rights and labor within contract farming
households in a Gambian irrigated rice project. Journal of Peasant studies, 15(3):
336-348.
88
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
CARROLL, T.O. (2002). The Irish mussel industry. Aquaculture technical section,
Bord lascaigh Mhara. Ireland.
COASE, R. (1937). The nature of the firm. Economica. 4: 386-405.
COASE, R. (1998). The new institutional economics. American Economic Review. 88
(2).
CHEUNG, S.M.S. (1992). On the new institutional economics and contract
economics. Edited by Lars. Wand Hans, W. Black well.
COLCHAO, S. (1999). Will AG banks prosper in an age of vertical integration. ABS
Banking Journal, 91 (11): 27-30.
DE BRUYN, P. (2001). Transaction cost as a basis for deciding on marketing
channels in the rural meat marketing of the Northern communal areas of Namibia.
MAgric Admin, Department, University of Stellenbosch.
DELGADO, C. (1999). Sources of growth in smallholder agriculture in Sub-Saharan
Africa: The role of vertical integration of small holders with processors and marketers
of high value-added items. Agrikon, 38.
DUVALEIX, S., CORDIER, J. AND HOVELAQUE, V. (2003). Contract design for
improving membership commitment in French Cooperatives. Paper prepared for
presentation at the American Agricultural Economics Association Annual Meeting,
Montreal, Canada, July 27-30. Renes cedex. France.
EGGERSTON, T. (1999). Economic behaviour and Institutions. Cambridge Press.
New York.
FAFCHAMPS, M. AND MINTEN, B. (1999). Property rights in a flea market
economy, MSSD Discussion paper 27. Washington, DC: International Food Policy
Research Institute.
FORREST, S. (1985). Documentation for Prisoner's Dilemma and NORMS programs
that use the generic algorithm. www.brunel.ac.uk/research/AIIalife/ga-axelr.htm
accessed 04/07103.
GLOVER, D. (1987). Increasing the benefits to smallholders from contract farming:
problems for farmers' organisation and policy makers. World Development, 15(4):
442-448.
GOW, H.R, STREETER, D.H. AND SWINNEN, J.M. (2000). How private contract
enforcement mechanisms can succeed where public institutions fail: the case of
Juhocukor a.s. Agricultural Economics, 23: 255-259.
89
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
GROSH, B. (1994). Contract farming in Africa: an application of the new institutional
economics. Journal of African Economies, 3(2): 233-266.
HARDMAN, P.A., DARROCH M, A.G. AND ORTMANN, G.F. (2002). Improving
cooperation to make the South African fresh apple export value chain more
competitive. Chain and network science.
HART, O. (1995). Firms, contracts and financial structure, Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
HEARN, B. (2002). The New Zealand Mussel industry. First international mussel
forum-country presentation. AC02 Abstracts. New Zealand Mussel industry council
Ltd, Blenheim, New Zealand.
HENNESSY, D.A. (1996). Information asymmetry as a reason for vertical integration.
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 78(40): 1036-1043.
HOBBS, J.E. (1996). A transaction cost approach to supply chain management. 1 (2).
MCB University Press.
HOBBS, J.E. (1997). Measuring the importance of transaction costs in cattle
marketing. American Journal of Agricultural Economics. 79: 1084-1091.
INTERNATIONAL TRADE CENTRE. (2003). South African trademaps.
www.trademap.net/sacu.list prod.htm Accessed 06/08/03.
INTERNATIONAL TRADE FORUM. (2002). A closer look: In country business
alliances. www.tradeforum.org/news/fullstory.php/aid/535/A Closer Look: In-
country _Bu accessed 22/08/03.
KARAAN, A.S.M. (1999). Bridging the small big divide: A transaction cost
approach to enterprise modelling to mussel mariculture in Saldanha Bay. Agrekon, 38
(4): 680-690.
KARAAN, A.S.M. (2002). Transaction costs in contract farming models for mussel
and oyster farming in South Africa: organisational and management implications.
International journal of aquaculture economics and management, 6 (5 & 6): 397-407.
KATJIUONGUA, H.P., (2001). Contract farming schemes in Sub-Saharan Africa
Key Ingredients for Success and Viability. PhD Thesis. Department of Agricultural
Economics. Michigan State University.
KENNEDY, E. (1994). Effects of sugarcane production in South Western Kenya on
income and nutrition. London: Johns Hopkins University Press.
KHERALLAH, M. (2000). Access of small holder farmers to the fruits and
vegetables market in Kenya. Mimeograph, Washington, DC: International Food
Policy Research Institute.
KING, GJ. (2002). Mussel farming in USA. Taylor Shellfish, Washington, USA.
90
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
KIRSTEN, J. AND SARTORIUS, K. (2002). Linking agribusiness and small-scale
farmers in developing countries: is there a new role for contract farming?
Development Southern Africa 19 (4): 2-33.
KOROVKIN, T. (1992). Peasants, grapes and corporations: the growth of contract in
a Chilean community. Journal of Peasant studies, 19(2): 229-250.
KRISTENSEN, P.S. AND PETERSEN, J.K. (2002). Mussel production in Danish
waters. First international mussel forum-country presentation. AC02 Abstracts.
Danish national environmental research institute. Denmark.
LEVI, M. (1998). When good defenses make good neighbours: A transaction cost
approach to trust and distrust. Department of Political Science. University of
Washington.
LEVIN, R. (1988). Contract farming in Swaziland: Peasant differentiation and the
constraints of land tenure. African Studies, 47 (2) 101-120.
LITTLE, P.D. AND WATTS, M.J. (1994). Living under contract. Madison, WI:
University of Wisconsin Press.
MAKHURA, M. T. (2001). Overcoming transaction costs barriers to market
participation of small holder farmers in the Northern Province of South Africa. PhD
Thesis. Department of Agricultural Economics, Extension and Rural Development.
University of Pretoria.
MASTEN, S.E. (1999). Nominal terms, real intentions, and contract interpretation. 2nd
annual conference of the international society for new institutional economics
(ISNIE). Paris, September 19-21.
MASUKU, M.B. (2003). The role of contractual relationships in the performance of
supply chains: the case of the sugar industry in Swaziland. Unpublished PhD thesis,
Department of Agricultural Economics, University of Pretoria.
MATHIESEN, H. (2003a). Decomposing costs into transaction costs and production
cost. The encyclopedia about Corporate Governance. Acad publishing.
www.encycogov.com accessed 05/09/03.
MATHIESEN, H. (2003b). Four basic contracts- Market bargain firm and
government. The encyclopedia about Corporate Governance. Acad publishing.
www.encYcogov.com accessed 05/09/03.
MATHIESEN, H. (2003c). Some basic cost decompositions in economics. The
encyclopedia about Corporate Governance. Acad publishing. www.encycogov.com
accessed05/09/03.
MENARD, M. (2000). Institutions, Contracts and Organisations: Perspectives from
New Institutional Economics. Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc. USA: 21-220.
91
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
MORVARIDI, B. (1995). Contract farming and environmental risk: the case of
Cyprus. Journal of Peasant studies, 23 (1): 33-44.
MEISSENHEIMER, J., KARAAN, A.S.M AND VINK, N. (2000). Sources of
transaction costs in the South African wine supply chain: Implications for enhancing
chain competitiveness. Department of Agricultural Economics, University of
Stellenbosch.
MILGROM, P. AND ROBERTS, J. (1992). Economics, Organisation and
Management. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs.
MINOT, N. (1986). Contract farming and its effect on small farmers in Less
Developed Countries. Michigan State University, International Development Papers,
Working paper No 31.
MOFFATT, M (2004). Monopsony.
www.economics.about.com/library/glossary/bldef-monopsony.htm.
10/12/04
Accessed
NATIONAL DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE. (2001). The strategic plan for
South African Agriculture. www.nda.gov.za . Accessed on 05/06/03
NEVES, F.M. (2000). Contract analysis as a marketing educational tool. Scholl of
Economics, Department of Business & Marketing. University of Sao Paulo. Brazil.
NGQANGWENI, S., KIRSTEN, J.F., AND DELGADO, C. (1999). Exploring growth
linkages in a South African smallholder farming area. Agrikon, 38 (4) : 585-591.
NORTH, D. (1990). Institutions, institutional change and Economic performance,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
PASOUR, E.e. (1998). The potential impact of increased vertical integration on
North Carolina grain farmers. North Carolina State University.
http://www.ncsoy.org/pasour2.htm accessed 03/05/03.
PIENAAR, V. (2004). Personal interviews. Managing Director, Blue Bay Aqua Farm
Pty. Ltd. Saldanha.
PROU, J. AND GOULLETQUER, T. (2002). The fresh mussel industry: Present and
perspectives. Shellfish Aquaculture research, Poitou-Charents, France.
QISHENG, T. AND JIANGUANG, F. (2003). Development of mussel farming in
China. First international mussel forum-country presentation. Yellow sea fisheries
research institute, Chinese academy of fisheries science. China.
REARDON, T. AND BARRETT, c.a (2000). Agroindustrialization, globalization
and international development: an overview of issues, patterns and determinants.
Agricultural Economics Journal, 23: 195-205.
92
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
REHBER, E. (1998). Vertical integration in agriculture and contract farming.
Regional research project No. NE-165: Private strategies, Public policies, and food
system performance. Department of Resource Economics. Amherst, MA: University
of Massachusetts.
RUDOLPH, D.W. (1999). Vertical organisation of agribusiness in transition
economies. Hungarian Production systems or Agricultural Franchising. Agribusiness.
15 (1): 25-40
RUNSTEN, D. AND KEY, N. (1996). Contract farming in developing countries:
Theoretical aspects and analysis of some Mexican Cases, Espanol.
ROY, E.P. (1963). Contract farming, USA. The interstate Printers and publishing, INC.
Danville, Illinois: 1-6.
ROYER, J.S. (1995). Potential for co-operative involvement in vertical co-ordination
and value added activities. Agribusiness, 11(3): 475-480.
SAUSSIER, S. (1999). When incomplete contract theory meets transaction cost
economics: A test on contractual choices. Working paper 98-14. University of Paris.
France.
SARTORIUS, K. (2003). Linking small-scale farmers to agribusiness: The economics
of contracting. Unpublished PhD thesis, Department of Agricultural Economics,
University of Pretoria.
SARTORIUS, K AND KIRSTEN, J.F. (2002). Can small scale farmers be linked to
agribusiness? The timber experience. Agrikon December 2002.
SUH, T., & KWON, W.G. (2003). The role of bilateral asset specificity &
Replaceability on Trust in Supply Chain Partner. Boeing Institute of International
Business, John Cook School of Business. Saint Louis University. Lindel Boulevard.
SCHRADER,L.F. (1986). Responses to forces shaping agricultural marketing: contract
farming. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 68(5).
SCHMIDT, M.K. (2001). Endogenous incomplete contracts. University of Munich.
www.econ.else.ac.uk/events/abstracts/etheory-010301.html. accessed 02/05/03.
SCHWARTZ, A. (1992). "Legal contract theories and incomplete contracts".
www.econ.else.ac.uk/events/abstracts/etheory-01 030 l.html. accessed 15/03/03.
SIMON, H. A. (1961). Administrative behaviour, 2nd ed. Macmillan. New York.
SIMON, H.A. (1976). From substantive to procedural rationality. American
Economic Review. 68:1-14.
SIMON, H.A. (1987). Boundary Rationality. Macmillan. New York.
93
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
SOFRANKO, A, FRERICHS, R, SAMY, M, AND SWANSON, B. (2000). Will
farmers organise? Structural change and loss of control over production.
http://web.aces.uuiuc.edu/value/research/organize.htm
SPILLER, P.T. (2002). Pablo Slipper's comments on "Preparatory Fieldwork
Proposals for Designing institutions for SME- Friendly Trade Liberalization"
University of California. Berkeley.
SPORLEDER, T.L. (1992). Managerial economics of vertically co-ordinated firms.
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 74: 1227-1229.
TREGURTHA, N.L., & VINK, N. (1999). Trust and supply chain relationships: A
South African case study. Agrikon, 38 (4): 755-765.
UNNEVEHER, LJ. (2000). Food safety issues and fresh food product exports from
LDCs. Agricultural Economics Journal, 23: 233-239.
VISSER, S. (2004). Personal interviews. Managing Director. Lavie Sea Food
Products (PTY) LTD. Veldriff.
VON BRAUN, J., HOTCHKISS, D., AND IMMANK, M. (1989). Non-traditional
export crops in Guatemala: Effects on Production, income and Nutrition. Washington,
D.C: International Food Policy Research Institute.
VON BRAUN, J AND KENNEDY, E. (1994). Agricultural Commercialisation,
Economic Development and Nutrition. John Hopkins University Press, London
WANG, N. (2003). Measuring transaction costs: An incomplete survey, University of
Chicago, Illinois. USA.
WARNING, M., KEY, N., AND SOO HOO, W. (2002). Small Farmer participation in
Contract Farming. Economic Research service, US Department of Agriculture.
University of Washington.
WIGGINS, H. (2005). Personal communication. Project Consultant. Stellenbosch.
WILLIAMSON, O.E. (1975). Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust
implications, A study in the economics of internal organisation. The Free Press. New
York.
WILLIAMSON, O. (1979). A transaction economics: The governance of contractual
relations, Journal of law and Economics, 22: 234-261.
WILLIAMSON, O. (1985). The economic institutions of capitalism. New York: Free
Press, Macmillan.
WILLIAMSON, O. (1995). The economic institutions of capitalism. Firms, Markets,
Relational contracting. The Free Press, New York.
94
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
WILLIAMSON, O. (1993). Calculativeness, trust, and economic organisation".
Journal of Law and Economics, 34: 454-499.
WILLIAMSON, O. (1996). The mechanisms of governance, Oxford University Press.
WILLIAMSON, O. (2003). Personal communication. Professor of Business Administration,
law, and economics. University of Calofornia, Barkeley. Annual conference for Agricultural
Economics Association of South Africa (AEASA), Pretoria.
WOLZ, A. AND KIRSCH, O.c. (1999). Equitization of agribusiness in Vietnam: Options for
small scale farmers with special emphasis on coffee production in Daklak Province.
Discussion paper No 69. Heidelberg, Germany: Research Centre for international Agrarian
and Economic Development. www.rzuser.uni-heidelberg.de/-t08/diskus69.htm accessed
06/06/03.
95
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
